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ROMAN CANON LAW IN THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH 
CHURCH: STUBBS VS. MAITLAND RE-EXAMINED 
AFTER 75 YEARS IN THE LIGHT OF SOME 
RECORDS FROM THE CHURCH COURTSf 
Charles Donahue, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THE Right Reverend William Stubbs, D.D. (1825-1901), was the Anglican Bishop of Oxford, sometime Regius Professor of 
Modem History at Oxford, and a scholar of considerable repute.1 
His Constitutional History of England2 was, until quite recently, 
the standard work in the field, and his editions of texts for the Rolls 
Series3 leave no doubt that he spent long hours ·with basic source 
material. Frederic William Maitland, M.A. (1850-1906), was an 
agnostic, the Downing Professor of the Laws of England at Cam-
bridge, and a scholar whose reputation during his life was perhaps 
not so wide as Stubbs' but whose work commanded the instant re-
spect of those who knew it.4 Maitland's History of English Law Be-
t Research for this Article was supported in part by the Ford Foundation Fund 
for International Legal Studies and the W.W. Cook Fund, both administered by The 
University of Michigan School of Law. I would like to thank the Borthwick. Institute 
of Historical Research and the Dean and Chapter of Canterbury for permission to 
cite and reproduce records in their respective custodies herein. I would also like to 
thank Mrs. N.K.M. Gurney, Director, and Dr. D.M. Smith, Acting Director, of the 
Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, York; Miss Anne M. Oakley, Archivist of 
the Cathedral Archives and Library, Canterbury; and Miss K.M. Longley, Archivist 
of the Dean and Chapter Library, York, for many kindnesses; the Reverend 
Michael Walsh, S.J., for allowing me to use the splendid collection of printed canon 
law material at Heythrop College, London; Professor Norma Adams for the use of 
her transcription of the Picheford case; Miss Rita Burns for help in checking citations; 
and Professors Thomas Green and R.H. Helmholz for many helpful suggestions for 
correction, rewriting, and clarification. An earlier version of this paper was read at an 
interdisciplinary seminar at the University of London's Institute for Advanced Legal 
Studies, and I benefited much from the stimulating discussion that followed. Of course, 
no one but me bears the responsibility for the errors and infelicities that remain in 
the piece. 
As this Article was going to press, I received from England the sad news of Mrs. 
Gurney's untimely death. I regret I have nothing better; I offer this, an indignum 
donum, to her memory. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1962, Harvard University; LL.B. 
1965, Yale University.-Ed. 
1. 3 DxcrIONARY oF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY William Stubbs 444 (Supp. 1912). 
2. '\V. STUBBS, THE CoNSI'ITOTIONAL HlsTORY OF ENGLAND IN !Ts ORIGIN AND DEVELOP• 
MENT (5th ed. 1891). For a recent attack on Stubbs' Constitutional History, see H. 
RICHARDSON &: G. SAYLES, THE GoVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND FROM: THE CONQUEST 
TO MAGNA CARTA (1963). 
3. For a general description of the series and a listing of Stubbs' contributions 
to it, see E. MUI.LINS, TEx.Ts AND CALENDARS: AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO SERIAL PUBLI• 
CATIONS 49-56 (Royal Historical Soc., Guides &: Handbooks No. 7, 1958). 
4. 2 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY Frederic Maitland 552 (Supp. 1912). 
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fore the Time of Edward 15 is still, in many ways, the standard work 
in the field, and his editions of texts for the Selden Society0 leave no 
doubt that he, too, was a man who knew the basic source material, 
Believing churchman vs. agnostic lawyer, constitutional and ecclesi-
astical historian vs. legal and constitutional historian, editor of 
chronicles vs. editor of legal documents, professor at Oxford vs. pro-
fessor at Cambridge-what more fitting pair to debate the question of 
the authority of the "Roman canon law" in medieval England? 
The best known statement of Stubbs' position on this question 
may be found in the Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commis-
sioners, published in 1883.7 The text of the Report, subscribed to 
if not written by Stubbs, states that "the canon law of Rome, though 
always regarded as of great authority in England, was not held to be 
binding on the courts."8 From the context of the sentence, it is quite 
clear that the Commissioners thought that neither the lay nor the 
ecclesiastical courts felt bound by "the canon law of Rome." Stubbs' 
Historical Appendix to the Commission's Report expands on this 
theme. According to this appendix, the sources of law for the English 
church courts up to the time of the Reformation were three. First 
was "the canon law of Rome,"9 that is, Gratian's Decretum,1° the 
Decretals of Gregory IX,11 the Sext of Boniface VIII,12 the Clemen-
tines,13 and the Extravagants.14 According to Stubbs, "a knowledge 
5. F. POLLOCK&: F. MA.lTLAND, THE HlsroRY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF 
EowARD I (2d ed. 1898). 
6. For a general description of the series and a listing of M:aitland's contributions, 
see E. MULLINS, supra note 3, at 276-79. 
7. 1 ECCLESIASTICAL CoURI's COMMlSSION, REPORT OF THE Co!ll:MISSIONERS INTO THE 
CONSTlTUTION AND WORKING OF THE EcCLESIASrICAL COURTS (Gr. Brit. 1883). 
8. Id. at xviii. 
9. Stubbs, Historical Appendix, in id. at 21, 25. 
10. This is the first book of the Corpus Juris Canonici. It was composed circa 1140 
by the monk Gratian of Bologna. The book is a compilation of canonic materials, 
canons of general and provincial councils, papal letters, and e.xcerpts from theological 
writings, from the entire range of sources known in Gratian's time, arranged systema-
tically, with Gratian's interspersed commentary. See generally A. VAN Hovi:, 
PROLEGOMENA IN CoDICEM JURIS CANONIC! §§ 343-51 (2d ed. 1945). 
11. This is the second book of the Corpus Juris Canonici and is principally a 
collection of papal decretal letters dating between 1140 and 1234. The book was 
compiled by the Dominican, Raymond of Pefiafort, and promulgated by the pope, 
Gregory IX, in 1234. See generally id. §§ 362-65. 
12. This is the third book of the Corpus Juris Canonici and is a collection of 
decretal letters and conciliar legislation dating between 1234 and the end of the 
thirteenth century, promulgated by Boniface VIlI in 1298. See generally id, §§ 368-70. 
13. This is the fourth book of the Corpus Juris Canonici, a collection principally 
of canons promulgated by Clement V in the Council of Vienne (1311-1312). The 
Clementines were promulgated by Clement's successor, John XXII, in 1317. See 
generally id. §§ 371-72. 
14. These are the last two books of the Corpus Juris Canonici and comprise the 
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of these was the scientific equipment of the ecclesiastical jurist, but 
the texts were not authoritative."15 Second was "the civil law of 
Rome," which, "from the reign of Stephen [mid-twelfth century] on-
wards, was refused any recognition except as a scientific authority in 
England."16 Third was "the provincial law of the Church of England 
contained in the constitutions of the archbishops from Langton down-
wards and the canons passed in the legatine councils under Otho and 
Othobon. The latter, which might possibly be treated as in them-
selves wanting the sanction of the national church, were ratified in 
councils held by Peck.ham."17 In Seventeen Lectures Stubbs develops 
the theme of ratification and suggests that the canon law of Rome 
was authoritative only if it had been ratified in national or provincial 
church councils.1S 
In a series of witty articles, which were published in book form 
seventy-five years ago last year, Maitland launched a broadside 
against Stubbs' position.19 The first three articles are each devoted 
to a different facet of Maitland's argument, but perhaps the best 
summary of his position is found in the first article, in which he 
answers the Commissioners' statement that the canon law of Rome 
was regarded as of great, but not binding, authority: "In all prob-
ability, large portions (to say the least) of the 'canon law of Rome' 
were regarded by the courts Christian in this country as absolutely 
binding statute law. . . . Each of them [the Decretals, Sext, and 
Extravagants of John XXII and the Common Extravagants. The Extravagants of John 
XXII consists of decretals of that pope. The Common Extravagants consists principally 
of fourteenth and fifteenth century decretal letters. Neither collection was officially 
promulgated in the Middle Ages. See generally id. §§ 373-75. 
Over the years standard citation forms have developed for the books of the 
Corpus Juris Canon!ci, and those forms will be used for those books that will be 
cited herein. The Decretals = "X" (from the fact that they were originally called 
Liber Extra, the book added onto Gratian's Decretum); the Sext = "VI" (from the 
fact that it was originally regarded as the sixth book after the five books of the 
Decretals); the Clementines = "CLEM." The arabic numbers following the indication 
of the collection refer to the book, title, and chapter, respectively. Thus, "CLEM. 
5.11,2," cited in note 174 infra, refers to book 5, title 11, chapter 2 of the Clementines. 
This can be found in the standard modem edition on which all subsequent citations 
of the text and rubrics of these books is based: 2 CoRPus JURIS CAN0N1c1 col. 1200 (A. 
Friedberg ed. 1879). The Friedberg edition contains only the text and the rubrics. 
For the glosses it is necessary to refer to an early printed edition. Citations herein to 
the glosses to the Decretals are to the edition printed by Nicholas de Benedictis, 
DECRETALES DOMINI PAPE GREGORII NONI (Lyons 1510). For the casus I have used 
DECRET.ALES cuM GLOssIS (Lyons 1584), See notes 189 & 213 infra. 
15. Stubbs, supra note 9. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. w. Snmns, SEVENTEEN LEcruREs ON THE STUDY OF MEDIAEVAL AND MODERN 
HmoRY 351, 354-57 (3d ed. 1900). 
19. F. l\iArrLAND, ROMAN CANON I.Aw IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1898). 
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Clementines] was a statute book deriving its force from the pope who 
published it, and who, being pope, was competent to ordain binding 
statutes for the catholic church and every part thereof, at all events 
within those spacious limits that were set even to papal power by 
the ius divinum and ius natu:rale."20 
Maitland adduces three principal bodies of evidence to support 
his view. First,21 there is William Lyndwood's Provinciale, a collec-
tion of English ecclesiastical legislation with elaborate glosses that 
was completed in 1430. Lyndwood was perhaps the most distinguished 
of all English medieval canonists, the Official (chief judge) of the 
Court of Canterbury and, later, bishop of St. David's.22 The book 
contajns numerous statements of the binding authority of the papal 
law collections; indeed, one must assume the binding authority of 
the papal law collections to make sense of the book, for what it con-
tains can only be regarded as a set of "bye-laws," as Maitland called 
them, with vast gaps, particularly in the important area of marriage, 
that must be filled in from papal sources. Second,23 there is the system 
by which the pope delegated the authority to hear cases brought 
before him to judges in the area in which the case originated. The 
judge delegate system is described24 by William of Drogheda, an 
Anglo-Irish canonist of the thirteenth century. Drogheda's book as-
sumes that the most important ecclesiastical cases will be heard be-
fore judges delegate, and recent research seems to confirm that this 
assumption is correct for Drogheda's time.25 The pope not only 
authorized judges delegate to hear the cases but also instructed them 
as to the law that they were to apply.26 These instructions, a remark-
ably large number of which are of English provenance, constitute a 
great part of the entries in the papal law collections.27 Third,28 
20. Maitland, Canon Law in England: I. William Lyndwood, 11 ENGLISH HISTORICAL 
REv. 446, 447-48 (1896), reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at l, 2-3. 
21. Maitland, supra note 20, at 468, 470-71, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 
19, at 3, 5, 38-39. 
22. Lyndwood's dates are 1375-1446. See generally 12 DIGTIONARY OF NATIONAL 
BIOGRAPHY William Lyndwood 340 (1893). 
23. Maitland, Canon Law in England: III. William of Drogheda and the Universal 
Ordinary, 12 ENGUSH HISTORICAL R.Ev. 625, 632-33 (1897), reprinted in F. MAITLAND, 
supra note 19, at 100, Ill-13. 
24. WILLIAM OF DROGHEDA, SUMMA AUREA in 2 QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DCS 
RoMIScH-KANoN1scHEN PROCESSES w MITI'ELALTER pt. 2 (L. Wahrmund ed. 1914). 
25. See J. SAYERS, PAPAL JUDGES DELEGATE IN THE PROVINCE OF CANTERDURY 1198-
1254 (1971). 
26. See Maitland, supra note 23, at 628, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, 
at 104-05. 
27. See Maitland, supra note 23, at 639, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, 
at 122. 
28. Maitland, Canon Law in England: II. Church, State, and Decretals, 11 ENGLISH 
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there are the various medieval English "church-state" controversies, 
of which the Becket affair and the papal provision controversy are 
perhaps the most familiar.29 During these ~ontroversies the English 
church maintained-stoutly in the case of Becket, and less stoutly 
but still maintained in the case of papal provisions-the position of 
the canon law of Rome against the royal assertion of native English 
law and custom. Lynd-wood's book, the judge delegate system, and 
the positions that the church took in opposition to the king are 
matters of fact. To the extent that Stubbs ignored them, he gave a 
distorted picture of what was actually going on. 
It is fair to say that the seventy-five years since the publication of 
Roman Canon Law in the Church of England have seen the general 
acceptance of the Maitland view. The one serious attempt to restore 
Stubbs' view30 is generally regarded as a failure,31 and Stubbs himself, 
in later editions of Seventeen Lectures, published what might be 
regarded as a retraction of his position.32 Perhaps the best measure 
of Maitland's success is the fact that the report of the Anglican Arch-
bishops' Commission on Canon Law, the work of a body that certainly 
cannot be accused of extreme papist views, specifically rejects the 
Ecclesiastical Court Commissioners' Report and adheres to the views 
of Maitland.83 
Despite this general acceptance, Maitland's views have recently 
been subject to some attempts at revision, and there seems to be 
emerging what we might call a "yes-but" school of thought on the 
matter: Yes, Maitland was basically right and Stubbs basically 
wrong, but .... 
In the case of Charles Duggan34 the "but" is that Maitland35 and, 
even more, Z. N. Brooke36 were ·wrong in thinking that the large 
HISTORICAL REv. 641, 647, 650 (1896), reprinted in F. :M:Arrl.AND, supra note 19, at 51, 
62, 65. 
29. For the Becket controversy, see A. POOLE, FROM DOMESDAY BOOK TO MAGNA 
CARTA 1087-1216, at 197-231 (Oxford History of England No. 3, 3d ed. 1970); for the. 
papal provision controversy, see w. PANTIN, THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN THE FOURTEENTH 
CENTURY 47-75 (1955). 
30. A. OGLE, CANON LAW IN MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND (1912). 
31. The views expressed in this book are pretty well demolished in Davis, The 
Canon Law in England, 34(47) ZEITSCHRlFI' DER SAVIGNY-STIFI1JNG 344 (Kan. Abt. No. 3, 
1913). Cf. Dibdin, Roman Canon Law in England, 217 Q. REv. 413 (1912), 
32. See W. STUBBS, supra note 18, at 335-36, 351 n.2, 354 n.3, 356 n.11. Cf. Dibdin, 
supra note 31, at 424-27. 
33. ARCHBISHOPS' Co:r..unSSION ON CANON LAw, THE CANON LAW OF THE CHURCH OF 
ENGLAND 36-37 (Gr. Brit. 1947). 
34. C. DUGGAN, TWELFTH CENTURY DECRETAL COLLECTIONS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE 
IN ENGLISH HISTORY (U. of London Historical Studies No. 12, 1963). 
35. Maitland, supra note 23, at 640, reprinted in F. MArrr.AND, supra note 19, at 123. 
36. Z.N, BROOKE, THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY FROZ..t THE CONQUEST TO 
THE REIGN OF JOHN 191-214 (1931). 
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percentage of decretals addressed to England found in the Decretals 
of Gregory IX gives any indication that English bishops were pecu-
liarly prone to asking que~tions of the papacy. The large percentage of 
English decretals, as Duggan's study shows, can be accounted for by 
the fact that many of the twelfth-century decretal collections on 
which the Decretals were ultimately based were of English prov-
enance.87 Now, the fact that English bishops had such collections 
made may indicate a peculiar devotion to papal law, but we certainly 
have no evidence from which to assume that English bishops received 
a disproportionate number of decretals. 38 
In the case of J. W. Gray the "but" is more serious. Maitland, 
says Gray, may be right as a matter of legal theory, but in practice 
the dominance of papal law was subject to two major qualifications: 
the English bishops' systematic nonenforcement of some of the papal 
law and the bishops' refusal to press specifically papal gravamina 
before the king. 39 
37. See C. DUGGAN, supra note 34, at 1-12. 
38. Brooke argued that prior to Becket the English church had remained aloof 
from Rome, at least on a legal plane, and had closely identified itself with the king 
and the king's law. See generally Z. N. BROOKE, supra note 36. After the Compromise 
of Avranches (1172), Brooke hypothesized, the papal letters that we find in the 
Decretals came flooding into England in order to bring the English church up to date 
after its long isolation. See generally id. Duggan's work casts doubt on the proposition 
that England received more papal letters than other European countries or that there 
was any need to bring the English church up to date. His findings, however, do not 
disprove Brooke's hypothesis about the situation before Becket; they only take away 
some of its support. It may be that the English bishops had collections made of papal 
letters, because they had a peculiar need to know what the papal canon law was (al• 
though the detailed and sophisticated nature of what they collected does not indicate 
that they were looking for basic principles). It seems more likely, however, that the 
English decretals are part of a general European phenomenon of the period: the rise 
and growth of the papal judicial system and papal law. See Cheney, The Compromise 
of Avranches of 1172 and the Spread of the Canon Law in England, 56 ENGLISH HIS• 
TORICAL R.Ev. 177 (1941). If Duggan is right, however, about the situation before Becket, 
a great deal of work that relied on Brooke's findings may need revision. E.g., 
Thorne, The Assize Utrum and Canon Law in England, 33 CoLUllf. L. R.Ev. 428, 428-36 
(1933). Clearly, however, Duggan's work does not upset Maitland's basic conclusion 
that after the Becket controversy the English church looked to the pope for definitive 
rulings on canon law, and it may support the proposition that it did so even before 
Becket. 
39. Gray, Canon Law in England: Some Reflections on the Stubbs-Maitland Contro• 
versy, in 3 STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY 48 (G. Cuming ed. 1966). Gravamina were the 
formal grievances that the English church presented to the king. Records of many 
of these gravamina survive, together with, in some cases, the king's reply, and they 
constitute important evidence for our knowledge of English medieval "church-state" 
relations on a political level. Exclusive reliance on these records is, however, dangerous. 
They frequently contain irreconcilable statements of principle, and they do not give 
us a clear view of how these conflicts were resolved in practice. A good collection of 
thirteenth-century gravamina may be found in F. POWICKE & C. CHENEY, COUNCILS 
AND SYNODS WITH OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING TO nm ENGLISH CHURCH (1964). A sum• 
mary of what they say about relations between king's courts and church courts may 
be found in Jones, Relations of the Two Jurisdictions: Conflict and Cooperation in 
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Finally, Dean E. W. Kemp, in his Litchfield lectures of a few 
years ago, suggests that Maitland's view of the Decretals, Sext, and 
Clementines as "absolutely binding statute law" must be modified 
in light of the fact that a large portion of these books is devoted to 
reporting papal decisions in specific cases.40 Thus, the papal law 
books may more fittingly be analogized to collections of cases than 
to collections of statutes. Since case law is more malleable than 
statute law, Maitland must be regarded as having overstated his posi-
tion. Further, Dean Kemp points out, no discussion of the authorita-
tive nature of the canon law in England is complete if one ignores 
the fact that canon law specifically recognizes custom as a source of 
law and recognizes that at times custom may override specific law to 
the contrary.41 
We can go even further than the "yes, but" school. Some of 
Stubbs' most questionable statements, if slightly recast, point to 
issues that are still unresolved. For example, that the papal collec-
tions were not authoritative in the English ecclesiastical courts can-
not be maintained,42 but precisely how they were authoritative may 
still be regarded as an open question. While it may be somewhat 
anachronistic to call the papal collections, as Dean Kemp does, 
"[l]eading cases in canon law,"43 it is positively misleading to call 
them statute books in the same sense that the Internal Revenue Code 
is a statute or even that a modem civil code, such as the French Code 
Civil or the Codex Juris Canonici of the Roman Catholic Church, is 
a statute book.44 Again, it cannot be maintained that it was necessary 
that papal law be ratified by national or provincial councils for it to 
be binding on the English Church.45 On the other hand, canonic 
·writers of the period generally held that a law had to have been 
promulgated before it was binding, and promulgation by a provincial 
council was a traditional and accepted method of giving a canon law 
binding force. Further, there was a respectable body of, medieval 
canonic opinion that held that at least some of the papal methods of 
England in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, 7 STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL RE-
NAISSANCE HlsTORY 79 (1970). 
40. E. KEMP, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 20-21 
(1957). Kemp points out that Stubbs defended his views on this ground after Maitland's 
attack. Id. at 14-16. 
41. Id. at 26-29. 
42. See, in addition to Maitland's work, part III infra. 
43. E. KEMP, supra note 40, at 21. 
44. See part m infra. , 
45. The evidence is summarized conclusively in Davis, supra note 31, at 351-58. 
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promulgation that did not involve national councils were of ques-
tionable validity.46 
Thus, there is some doubt whether Maitland said the last word 
on the authoritative nature of the Roman canon law in medieval 
England. That doubt suggests that the time may have come for a re• 
examination of the question. Since Maitland wrote, considerably 
more evidence has come to light. In particular, scholars47 have finally 
gotten around to examining a source that Maitland himself sug-
gested48 was crucial to the solution of the problem-the records of 
the English medieval ecclesiastical courts themselves. These records 
are important because it is only through them that we can find out 
whether and how the theory that we find in Lyndwood was applied 
in practice, and it is only through them that we can confirm or 
refute the suggestion Maitland made on the basis of Drogheda49 that 
all significant questions of canon law were resolved by papal rescript. 
Further, these records can give another dimension to our under• 
standing of how the king's and the church's seemingly irreconcilable 
statements of jurisdictional principle were resolved in practice. 
Although the records of the ecclesiastical courts are not the un• 
charted sea that they were in Maitland's· day, few of the many sur-
viving records have been published;50 many have not been carefully 
examined in manuscript; and many, indeed, still need to be sorted and 
calendared. A sufficient amount of work has been done with these 
records, 51 however, that segments of them can be examined for the 
light they shed on the Stubbs-Maitland debate. Any general conclu-
sions, of course, ·will only be valid to the extent that they prove to be 
tme of the records that cannot be so examined at this time. But the 
46. On medieval canonists on promulgation, see M. LOHMULLER, THE PROMULGA• 
TION OF LA.w 25-27, 68-92 (Catholic University of America, Studies in Canon Law No. 
241, 1947); 2 C. PLoCHL, GESCHICHTE DES KmCHENRECHTs 62-63 (1955). Lyndwood, how-
ever, does not appear to have been among those who had doubts. See ·w. LYNDWOOD, 
PROVINCIALE lib. 1, tit. 3, c. [I] (Hujus autem), gloss on publicam notionem (1679). Cf. 
Davis, supra note 31, at 357 n.l. 
47. E.g., Sheehan, The Formation and Stability of Marriage in Fourteenth Century 
England: Evidence of an Ely Register, 33 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 228 (1971); Helmholz, 
Canonical Defamation in Medieval England, 15 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr0RY 255 (1971). 
48. Maitland, supra note 23, at 644-45, reprinted in F. 1\.fAITLAND, supra note 19, at 
130-31. 
49. Maitland, supra note 28, at 641-42, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 
51, 51-53. 
50. Jones, supra note 39, at 99 n.47, contains a bibliography of most of what has 
been published. 
51. Most of them are now in the hands of professional archivists and are available 
for examination by qualified scholars. Thorough sorting and calendaring has begun. 
See, e.g., D. SMITH, A GUIDE TO THE ARCHIVE CoLLECrIONS IN THE 130RTHWICK INsrrrtJTE 
OF HisroruCAL RESEARCH (13orthwick Texts &: Calendars No. 1, 1973). 
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time seems ripe for making an initial examination and drawing some 
tentative conclusions, subject to revision in the light of new evidence. 
The succeeding parts of this essay will be devoted to those tasks. 
Before we get to that, however, let us try to define more carefully 
the purpose and scope of the inquiry. The question of how binding 
the authority of the Roman canon law was in medieval England was 
an important one for Stubbs because he wanted to use the results 
of his inquiry to support his position in the ecclesiological contro-
versies of his day. If he could demonstrate the independence of the 
English church from Rome prior to the Reformation, he could use 
that independence to counteract the arguments of the "Romish" 
churchmen of his time. If he could demonstrate an identity of 
position of the medieval English church and the medieval English 
kings, he could use that identity to argue, at least on historical 
grounds, against disestablishment of the Anglican Church.52 
While the results of our inquiry may still have some relevance 
for the ecclesiological debates of our own time, modem scholarship 
has seen an importance in the question beyond the polemical pur-
poses to which its answer might be put. The ecclesiastical historian 
wants to understand more fully the interrelationship benveen the 
papacy, the state, and the local churches in the Middle Ages. This 
understanding may, depending on his philosophy of history, be im-
portant to him simply for its intrinsic interest, or to help him under-
stand how we have gotten to where we are, or because a knowledge 
of the true nature of these relationships in the past, although they 
cannot be recreated, may help him or others to shape similar relations 
in the future. 
For us as legal historians or as lawyers, on the other hand, the 
purpose of the inquiry is different. An inquiry into the binding 
nature of the canon law in medieval England may help us to explore 
two separate groups of questions. First, is it possible for nvo different 
legal systems--canon law and common law-to operate simulta-
neously in the same geographic area, particularly when those nvo legal 
systems make overlapping jurisdictional claims? Since the king had 
an army in England and the pope did not, wouldn't all such conflicts 
be resolved in favor of the king, and if this were the case, in what 
sense could papal law be said to be "binding"? How would. a court 
behave if it were subject to a theoretically binding law emanating 
from the Court of Rome when there was a competing law, backed by 
52. Gray, supra note 39, contains an excellent summary of the ecclesiological debates 
of Stubbs' time and of the influence that they may have had on his work and on that 
of his followers. " 
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secular force, emanating from the Court of Westminster? More gen-
erally, how did these three sets of legal institutions-the papal courts, 
the royal courts, and the local ecclesiastical courts-relate to each 
other? 
Second, putting to one side the potential institutional conflicts, 
to what extent is any body of law "binding" on a judge called upon 
to decide a given case? To what extent and in what way does a judge 
use law to decide a case? Specifically, how were the papal law books 
used in the English courts Christian? 
With these two broad sets of questions in mind, we can further 
subdivide the inquiry. In Part II we shall examine, in the light of 
the records of the Consistory Court of York from the years 1300-1399, 
two sets of institutional relationships-that between the English 
church courts and the king's courts and that between the English 
church courts and the papal court-and we shall also examine the 
sources of the law applied in the English church courts. In Part III 
we shall tum to the question of how the papal law was applied by 
examining some "briefs" that survive from the Canterbury ecclesi-
astical courts in the thirteenth century. In Part IV we shall essay some 
tentative conclusions. 
II. THE YORK CONSISTORY COURT, 1300-1399 
One way of getting a feel for what the records of the ecclesiastical 
courts have to offer is to look at the work of one court over an ex-
tended period of time. For this purpose, let us look at the Consistory 
Court of York in the fourteenth century. Two reasons prompt this 
selectio"ii: the importance of the court and the number and richness 
of its surviving records. The Archbishop of York not only had juris-
diction over his mvn large diocese but also had appellate jurisdiction 
over the suffragan dioceses of Durham and Carlisle. 58 The Consistory 
53. For a discussion of the relationship between York and its suffragan dioceses 
(including the Scottish diocese of Whithorn), see R. BRENTANO, YORK METROPOLITAN 
JURISDICTION AND PAPAL JUDGES DELEGATE 1279-1299, at 83-114 (U. of Cal. Publications 
in History No. 58, 1959), 
For the reader who is unfamiliar with medieval ecclesiastical jurisdiction, a brief 
and simplified introduction may be in order. The smallest unit of jurisdiction was the 
parish. Parishes were grouped into deaneries, and deaneries into archdeaconries, the 
smallest unit in which one normally finds a regularly sitting court, presided over by 
the archdeacon's official. Archdeaconries were grouped in dioceses, headed by a bishop 
or an archbishop. Each diocese had at least one consistory court presided over by the 
bishop's or archbishop's official. The bishop or archbishop might also have had a 
personal court, frequently called the court of audience. 
Provinces were groupings of dioceses headed by an archbishop and containing his 
diocese and one or more suffragan dioceses, each headed by a bishop, Appeals from the 
suffragan dioceses could be heard in the archbishop's consistory court, as at York, or 
in a separate court established for the purpose, such as the only other medieval English 
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Court of York, which exercised a large part of the Archbishop's 
"civil" jurisdiction, heard both first instance cases from within the 
York diocese and appeals from inferior courts of both the diocese 
and the larger province.54 Since almost all the records of the Court of 
Arches, the appellate court of the Archbishop of Canterbury, have 
been lost,55 the York court's records are the only records that survive 
in any quantity from a medieval English provincial church court. 
Further, the records of the York court for the fourteenth century are 
not only numerous but extraordinarily rich. There exist some 263 
sets of cause papers,56 documents actually used in litigation. Nothing 
comparable survives from any other church court of this period.57 
There are also some fragments of books of acta, journals of the 
court's daily business, from the years 1370-1375.58 
Because some cases are divided among tw-o or more sets of cause 
papers, the 263 sets of cause papers actually represent some 232 cases, 
provincial church court, the Court of Arches in the Canterbury province. See gen-
erally 1 W. Hor.nswoRnr, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 598-603 (7th ed. rev. 1956); F. 
l\!AKOWER, THE CONS11TUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND §§ 33-44, 59-66 
(1895). 
54. It seems that any litigant could, if he chose, bring his case before the York 
Consistory, if the reus (defendant) resided within the York diocese. Because of the great 
distances within the York diocese, however, less important cases were frequently begun 
before an official of one of the five archdeaconries: York, East Riding, West Riding, 
Richmond, or Nottingham. Appeals lay to the York Consistory from the archdeacons' 
courts and also from the various peculiars (special jurisdictions within the diocese, such 
as the peculiar of the collegiate church of Beverley or that of the Dean and Chapter of 
York Minster (Cathedral)). Appeals, but apparently not first instance cases, could be 
brought to York from the consistory courts of the bishops of Durham and Carlisle. 
See generally R. BRENTANO, supra note 53. -
55. See D. OWEN, THE RECORDS OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH IN ENGLAND 50-51 
(British Records Assn., Archives &: the User No. 1, 1970). 
56. These records have been deposited by the Archbishop in the :Borthwick Institute 
of Historical Research, St. Anthony's Hall, York. They are numbered, more or less in 
chronological order, "CP .E. l" to "CP .E. 263." Since the research for this paper was 
completed, the Borthwick has undertaken to renumber the CP .E. series, moving cases 
that do not belong in the fourteenth century to their appropriate place, consolidating 
numbers where a given case is divided among two or more sets of papers, and adding 
numbers where two or more cases may be found in one set of papers. The citations in 
this article are to the CP .E. numbers as they existed prior to the beginning of the 
renumbering effort. The new numbers may be traced by looking up the old numbers 
in a handlist kept at the Borthwick. · 
I am currently undertaking an edition of a selection of the fourteenth-century cause 
papers for the Selden Society. 
57. A selection of similar records for the thirteenth-century Canterbury courts is 
being edited for the Selden Society by Professor Norma Adams. Curiously, the quantity 
of the Canterbury records declines markedly in the early fourteenth century, just when 
the York series begins. 
58, These fragments are contained in M2(l)b and M2(l)c of the Dean and Chapter 
Library, York. M2(l)b contains entries from January to July, 1371. M2(l)c contains 
entries from October 1371 to October 1375, but there appear to be a number of gaps 
in the sequence. 
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bearing dates from 1301 to 1399.59 We have reason to believe that the 
court handled roughly 50-100 cases a year, so that the total number of 
cases heard over the century was probably in the range of 5-10,000.60 
Thus, cause papers survive from two to four per cent of the cases 
heard in this period. There is aiso evidence that the process by which 
these cases, rather than others, have survived is random. If this is 
correct, then the surviving cause papers represent a statistically valid 
random sample of cases heard in the York Consistory Court during 
the fourteenth century. 61 
Table I lists the number of cases in the cause papers by decade 
and type.62 To summarize, marriage cases (including both actions 
for restoration of conjugal rights and for divorce) account for about 
forty per cent of the total. Cases involving ecclesiastical finances, 
including cases concerning the right to the income of a parish 
church or other ecclesiastical office (benefice), and litigation about 
church taxes (tithes), about a portion of the income of a benefice 
(pension), or about miscellaneous moneys owing or usually paid 
(other financial), represent about thirty per cent. The remaining 
thirty per cent are divided roughly as follows: cases concerning wills 
(testamentary), nine per cent; defamation, six per cent; breach of 
faith, five per cent; ecclesiastical jurisdiction, four per cent. The 
remaining four per cent represents a miscellaneous group of cases, 
including five appeal cases, the underlying substance of which is 
unclear, four cases involving the finding of a chaplain for a church, 
and one each involving assault, trespass to land, breach of a guardian's 
59. In addition to consolidating cases divided among two or more sets of papers, I 
have also excluded from the count nine cases that bear dates in the fifteenth century, 
five cases that can, with reasonable confidence, be assigned to the fifteenth or later 
centuries on the basis of paleographical and diplomatic evidence, and ten cases that 
seem to belong to the fourteenth century but cannot be assigned to any decade within 
that century. See note 62 infra and accompanying te....:t. 
CP.E. 1 (1301) is the earliest surviving set of York cause papers that has come to my 
attention. Over 300 sets of cause papers exist for the fifteenth century, and the number 
for each of the three succeeding centuries runs into the thousands. 
60. I.e., defining "case" as a piece of business coming before the court that was suf-
ficiently contended to have produced cause papers. See Appendix A infra. 
61. For a discussion of the statistical problem, see Appendix A infra. 
62. For the truly ambitious reader who wishes to calculate the proportions after 
including the cases that can be assigned to the fourteenth century, although not to any 
particular decade within that century, I can report that CP.E. 258 and CP.E. 24Iz arc 
tithe cases; that CP.E. 90, CP.E. 240, and CP.E. 241s are "other financial," the first 
involving the rebuilding of a parish church, the second a mortuary, and the third, an 
inquisition about dilapidations of a chancel; that CP.E. 42 apparently involves the 
jurisdiction (perhaps the tithes) of a parish church and a hospital; that CP.E. 166 and 
CP.E. 2410 are defamation cases; and that CP.E. 241v is a marriage case and involves 
an appeal to Rome. I challenge anyone who enjoys straining his eyes under ultraviolet 
light to figure out what CP.E. 167 is about. 
TABLE I 
YORI{ CASES BY DECADE AND TYl'E 
' 
1300-1309 1310-1319 1320-1329 1330-1339 1340-1349 1350-1359 1360-1369 
Marriage 3 l 5 7 6 6 13 
Tithe 1 l 5 3 4 
Benefice 2 2 2 4 4 5 4 
Testamentary 2 l 2 2 
Defamation 1 l l 3 
Breach of faith l 
Jurisdiction l 1 I 2 2 
Appeal 
Pension 1 2 
Other Financial 1 3 
Miscellaneous l 1 1 
TOTAL 6 5 10 17 17 20 34 
1370-1379 1380-1389 1390-1399 
12 10 27 
1 4 12 
1 5 







1 1 3 
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duties, violation of a sequestration, and procedural matters (the un-
derlying substance being unclear).63 
From the point of view of the relationship of the king to the 
English church, a most striking characteristic of the York court's 
jurisdiction is the number of cases that the court heard that "ought" 
to have been in the king's courts. In fact, there are "jurisdictional 
problems" with over forty per cent of the cases that the court was 
hearing-with every category other than the marriage, testamentary, 
and jurisdiction cases. For example, an examination of the texts of 
the various writs of prohibition that might issue from the Chancery04 
would lead one to the conclusion that the king's courts claimed juris-
diction of ordinary cases of breach of contract to the exclusion of the 
ecclesiastical courts, and there is evidence that the king's judges 
thought that this was the law.e5 Yet we find a number of cases before 
the York court in which disputes about ordinary commercial contracts 
were heard under the rubric of breach of faith (laesio fidei). For ex-
ample, Lawrence Litster·c. Lady Katherine, wife of Sir John Ward, 
63. At the 90 per cent confidence level we can estimate that the underlying marriage 
cases represent 33-44 per cent of the underlying population; ecclesiastical finances, 25-35 
per cent; and miscellaneous, 25-35 per cent. See Appendix A infra. The confidence 
intervals for the totals of the types of cases of which there are more than 10 examples 
listed in Table 1 follow: 
Number Per cent Intervals 
Type of Case of Cases of Total (in per cent) 
Marriage 89 38 33-44 
Tithe 31 13 9-17 
Benefice 29 13 9-17 
Testamentary 22 9 6-12 
Defamation 14 6 3-9 
Breach/Faith 11 5 2-8 
Jurisdiction 10 4 2-7 
64. For example, Writ No. 121 in a register of writs of the early fourteenth century 
reads, in pertinent part: 
We prohibit you [the official of the bishop of Durham] from holding in Court 
Christian a plea concerning chattels or debts whereof A. complains that B. is 
driving him into a plea before you in Court Christian unless those chattels or 
debts relate to a testament or a marriage, because pleas concerning chattels and 
debts which do not relate to a testament or a marriage pertain to our crown and 
dignity. 
EARLY REGISTERS OF WRITS 137 (Selden Society No. 87, E. de Hass & G, Hall ed. 1970) 
(register can be found in Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS. Rawlinson C292, ff. 9a-104a). 
For York examples, see CP.E. 141; CP.E. 72. 
On the writ of prohibition generally, see Adams, The Writ of Prohibition to Court 
Christian, 20 MINN. L. REv. 272 (1935); Flahiff, The Writ of Prohibition to Court 
Christian in the Thirteenth Century [pt. l], 6 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261 (1944); Flahiff, 
The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century [pt. 2], 7 ME• 
DIAEVAL STUDIES 229 (1945); Jones, supra note 39, at 85-87. 
65. See statements from yearbooks quoted in 2 w. HOLDSWORTH, HlsrORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 305 (4th ed. 1936). 
March 1974] Stubbs vs. Maitland 661 
Kt.,66 involves a suit by a York dyer for 76~.Sd., which he claims the 
lady agreed to pay him for dying a batch of wool. 
Not only did the York court hear breach of contract cases, but it 
also served as a kind of registry for recording contracts. The acta for 
the period from January to July 1371 contain eleven entries of 
promises to pay, for a variety of reasons, sums ranging from 3s.2d. to 
£40.67 This contract jurisdiction is not peculiar to York. The four-
teenth- and fifteenth-century act books of the Canterbury Consistory 
Court reveal thousands of breach of contract cases, 68 and similar 
cases may be found in many surviving church court records of the 
period.69 
The breach of faith cases are not the only ones that we would be 
surprised to find in a church court. From at least the time of the 
Becket controversy (third quarter of the twelfth century) the English 
king had claimed jurisdiction over disputes involving advowsons.70 
Papal law, on the other hand, claimed jurisdiction over such disputes 
because of the spiritual nature of the advowson.71 Attempts by the 
church courts to hear disputes about advowsons, we learn from those 
who have examined the plea rolls, were regularly prohibited.72 The 
York court did not claim to hear advowson cases as such, but it 
regularly heard cases involving the right to possession of a given 
church. Since the possessor normally had some kind of claim of right, 
these benefice cases frequently involved an underlying dispute over 
the patronage.73 
Considerably more work needs to be done with these fourteenth-
century benefice cases before we can be sure precisely what is at stake 
in each of them. A few statements, however, can be made at this time: 
66. CP.E. 180 (1390). 
67. See l\!2(l)b, supra note 58. 
68. B. WOODCOCK, MEDIEVAL ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE DIOCESE OF CANTERBURY 
89-92 (1952). 
69. See R. Helmholz, Private Actions for Breach of Faith in the Medieval Church 
Courts (unpublished paper delivered at Am. Soc. for Legal History Third Annual 
Meeting, Chicago, Nov. 9, 1973). 
70. An advowson is a species of incorporeal property that gives the patron (the 
owner of the advowson) the right to present a clerk (a generic term for an ecclesiastic 
who had taken even minor orders) to some vacant benefice (an ecclesiastical office, 
like that of parish priest, which carried with it an income). Normally, the patron 
would present his candidate to the bishop; the bishop would determine if the can-
didate were qualified; and, if the candidate were found qualified, the bishop would 
institute the candidate to the benefice. For a brief review of the history with further 
references, see Jones, supra note 39, at 102-32. 
71. See X 3.38,21. See also X 3.38 (entire title). 
72. See Jones, supra note 39, and sources cited therein. 
73. See, e.g., John de Singleton c. Simon de Hockyngham, CP.E. 39 (1339); Peter 
Gabun c. Bishop of Durham, CP .E. 127 (1382). " 
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(1) None of the cases involves a suit by one patron against another. 
(2) Papal provisors74 would bring their cases to the ecclesiastical 
courts (and ultimately to Rome) when the validity of the papal 
provision was at stak.e.75 (3) Even a presentee of the king would bring 
his suit to the ecclesiastical courts when the issue was whether the 
benefice to which he was presented was in fact vacant76 or when he 
was disturbed in the possession of his living by threats of excommuni-
cation by the prior of a neighboring religious house.77 (4) Many of 
the cases involve presentation of a vicar and not of a rector.78 The 
right to present a vicar was normally held by a monastery. This fact, 
coupled with the relative newness of the institution and the confused 
nature of the law surrounding it, 79 may have raised some doubt 
whether the king's law applied and may account for the presence 
of these cases in ecclesiastical courts. 
It was fairly well established as a matter of royal law that a 
dispute over tithes that involved one quarter or more of the income 
of the living (the benefice to which the tithes were attached) was 
cognizable in the king's courts, because the decision in such a case 
would affect the value of the advowson. 80 This rule appears to have 
been ignored by the York Consistory Court, which apparently relied 
on the papal law81 that declared all tithes to be cognizable by the 
ecclesiastical courts because of their spiritual nature. Many of the 
tithe cases, of course, involve sums that must have been less than 
one fourth of the value of the living;82 other cases, however, seem to 
involve large sums, sums that must have been greater than one fourth 
of the value of the living. 83 The court heard both types of cases and 
74. That is, clerks who had obtained a claim to the benefice from the pope by 
papal provision, a process that bypassed the presentation process. See generally W. 
PANTIN, supra note 29. 
75. E.g., Ubertino, Rector of Egglescliffe c. John de Hylawe [?], CP.E. 35 (1338). 
76. See, e.g., William de Skipwith c. Robert de Rishton, CP.E. 47 (1341). 
77. See, e.g., William Pulkowe c. Prior of Haltemprlce, CP.E. 64 (1352), 
78. E.g., John Godens [?] c. Richard de Sysonby, CP.E. 24 (1325); Adam de IUlming• 
ton, Vicar of Kernetteby [?] c. William Fynelay, CP.E. 94 (1367). On the appropriation 
of benefices by monasteries and the resulting distinction between rectors and vicars of 
parish churches, see F. MAKowER, supra note 53, at 329-32; R. HARTRIDGE, A HlsToRY 
OF VICARAGES IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1930). 
· 79. See id. 
80. See Jones, supra note 39, at 161-62, and sources cited therein. 
81. See, e.g., X 3.30.25. 
82. See, e.g., John de Tewcatcs [?], Rector of Lofthouse c. Robert dcl Wode, CP.E. 
141 (1385) (six pence; prohibited (I), see text accompanying notes 80 supra &: 83, 99 
infra); Thomas Porter, Rector of Ryther c. John Webster, CP.E. 228 (1394) (eighteen 
pence). Lofthouse was valued at eight pounds in 1318. TAXAno EcCLESIASTICA ANGLIAE 
ET WALLIAE 324 (Gr. Br. 1802). Ryther was valued at £16 13s.4d. in 1291. Id, at 323. 
83. E.g., John Brimham, Rector of Walkington c. John Midilton, CP.E. 222 (1394) 
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proceeded in the same way regardless of the amount involved. There 
is no evidence in these or in any other cases in the fourteenth-century 
papers that the court was concerned about whether it exceeded its 
jurisdictional boundaries, as those boundaries were viewed by the 
king's law, and there is no record in any of these cases, even in the 
ones that were prohibited, of counsel's attempting to argue that the 
court was exceeding its royally defined jurisdiction or even of coun-
sel's suggesting that a prohibition might lie. 
The contract, benefice, and tithe cases do not exhaust the types 
of cases that, from the point of view of the king's law, are surprising 
to find in an ecclesiastical court. The trespass to land case (brought 
by a clerk against a layman) is certainly an odd one to find in an 
ecclesiastical court.84 Similarly, we might wonder about the assault 
case, although it involved assault on a prioress and resulted, therefore, 
in the defendants' being subjected to the ecclesiastical sanction of 
excommunication.85 We might even wonder about the five pension 
cases (all involving churchmen) in the light of the text of the writ 
prohibiting one of them.86 In many of these cases it would seem that 
the court's claim to jurisdiction rested on the canon law's notion that 
cases involving churchmen belonged before the ecclesiastical courts 
regardless of the subject matter of the suit.87 
Further, even the cases that we might expect to find in eccle-
siastical courts frequently involve holdings that would certainly have 
seemed odd to the judges of the king's courts. Abbot & Convent of St. 
Alban's c. Peter Flemyng& Johanna, daughter of Mariota,88 is perhaps 
the most striking example. Walter Flemyng was a York priest and 
apparently a man of some substance.89 He made a will leaving his 
(10 pounds). Walkington was valued at 20 pounds in 1291. See TAXATIO EcCLESIASl'ICA 
.ANGLIAE ET W ALLIAE, supra note 82, at 302. 
84. Prior&: Convent of Newburgh c. William Trolley, CP.E. 75 (1357). The prohibi-
tion de transgressione (concerning trespass) might have lain here, even though the 
tresspass is to a church and cemetery, and the pleadings indicate that excommunication 
on the ground of desecration seems to have been a possible sanction. On the writ 
de transgressione, see Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra note 64, at 279-80. See 
also text accompanying note 154 infra. 
85. Pr1oress of Handale c. Nicholas de Mersk [?], CP .E. 3 (1306). Chapter 3 of 
Articuli Cleri, 10 Edw. 2, stat. 1, c. 3 (1316) would probably permit the church courts to 
impose this sanction: " ••• if any lay violent hands on a clerk [including a religious 
woman?], the amends for the peace broken shall be before the King, and for excom-
munication before a prelate • • • ." 
86. See note 97 infra and accompanying text. But cf. Jones, supra note 39, at 161-62. 
87. On jurisdiction ratione personae (by reason of the person), see P. FOURNIER, LEs 
OFFICIAL1TES AU MOYEN AGE 64-82 (1880). 
88. CP .E. 169 (1369). 
89. Walter may have been the son or brother of Nicholas Flemyng, who was Lord 
Mayor of York in the early fourteenth century. See P. Tn.r.orr, A HlsroRY OF YORK-
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property to his niece, Johanna, his sister's daughter, and to one Peter 
Flemyng, who may have been his brother or his nephew-the rela-
tionship is not stated. When the will was duly probated, the Abbot 
and Convent appeared before the York court and offered a competing 
document, a subsequent will of Walter's that had been probated 
before the official of the bishop of Avignon. Apparently Walter had 
spent his last days at the papal court in Avignon. There he had duly 
executed a will with a decidedly continental flavor in that he made 
one Robert of Worms his universal heir and devised all his land to 
St. Alban's. After failing to show that the second will was formally 
defective, Peter and Johanna's proctor filed a brief in which he 
patiently explained that, with some exceptions not applicable to the 
case, English land could not be devised without leave of the king. He 
might have added, although he did not, that conveyances of land to 
monasteries were void under the Statute of Mortmain. 00 The court 
brushed his arguments aside and rendered judgment for the mon-
astery. One would have thought that Peter and Johanna would then 
have brought an action in the king's courts. They seem not to have, 
however; instead, they appealed to the pope, and at this point the 
case disappears from view.01 
The Flemyng case leaves many tantalizing questions unanswered. 
If either Peter or Johanna were Walter's heir at law, why did the heir 
not bring an Assize of Mort d' Ancestor or ·writ of entry against the 
monastery, which, they alleged, had seized the rents of the land? If 
neither of them were Walter's heir, why did they argue that a will of 
English land was void? This argument, if it had been accepted, would 
have undercut their claim under the prior will just as much as it 
would have undercut the monastery's. Nonetheless, the case provides 
a fascinating insight into the independence of the church courts from 
the rules of the king's law and also indicates that at least some litigants 
preferred to pursue their cases within the church system even when 
they ought not have been there. Once the litigants got into the church 
courts, they discovered there a system prepared to deal with their 
cases according to its own rules. 
sHIRE: THE CITY oF YoRK 55, 110, 404 (Victoria County Histories 1961). He was almost 
certainly a member of the landed York family of that name. See id. at 41. 
90. 7 Edw. 1, stat. 2 (1279). In fact, the Flemyings' proctor may have confused the 
common law rule prohibiting the devise of much of English land, which did not in• 
clude, at least as a regular matter, an e.xception when the king's permission was ob-
tained, with the statutory rule against conveying land to monasteries, which expressly 
allowed for royal dispensation. See generally M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL 
ENGLAND 266-81 (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Studies &: Texts No. 6, 1963). 
91. Of course, Peter or Johanna may ultimately have gone to the king's courts. The 
choice of the ecclesiastical forum did not preclude, at least in practice, the pursuit 
of a remedy in another forum. See note 248 infra. 
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The fact that church courts decided cases over which the king's 
law claimed jurisdiction and decided issues in cases where it con-. 
cededly had jurisdiction in a way that undercut the king's law is of· 
some relevance to the Stubbs-Maitland debate. The papal law, at 
various times, claimed jurisdiction over most of these matters, 92 
despite what the secular law said, and the fact that the York court 
heard such cases indicates that this claim was more than a theoretical 
one. This finding, however, is not a new one. No recent scholarship 
suggests that the English church simply acceded to the royal claims 
of jurisdiction, and the accepted view93 seems to be that, at least in 
the fourteenth century, the king did not attempt to force cases in the 
disputed jurisdictional area out of the church courts and into his own 
if the parties to the case did not object to having the case proceed in 
the church courts. If either of the parties wished the case removed to 
the king's courts, however, that party could obtain a writ of prohibi-
tion, thereby stopping the church court proceedings and effectively 
demonstrating the superiority of the king's law. In this way, as one 
recent writer has put it, the king kept a steady, gentle pressure on the 
church courts to bring them into line.94 
The York records contain evidence both to support and to under-
cut this view. There are eight cases in the sample that involve writs 
of prohibition. There is no evidence that any of the ·writs was dis-
obeyed. Two of the cases95 are in the acta, but not in the cause 
papers. The acta entries indicate that_ these cases were prohibited, but 
we have no idea of the nature of the underlying suit. Of the cases in 
the cause papers involving prohibitions, one is a benefice case in 
which two ·writs of prohibition are found in documents submitted 
to the court.96 Why the party cho_se to submit these documents 
is unclear, since they do not, at least on their face, prohibit the hear-
ing of the case currently before the court. They may be there as a 
warning to the court not to proceed ·with a certain aspect of the case, 
or they may be there simply to <:X-Plain why the underlying issue in 
92. See P. FOURNIER, supra note 8'7, at 64-94, and sources cited therein. 
93. See Jones, supra note 39, at 204. 
94. Id. 
95. Wife of William de Selby c. John de Gisbur, M2(l)(b) [Dean & Chapter Library, 
York] f. 7r (1371); Richard del See c. William de Hexham, M2(l)b [Dean & Chapter 
Library, York] f. 9v (1371). 
96. John de Singleton c. Simon de Hock.yngham [?], CP.E. 39 (1339). The two writs 
are in the same form but involve different parties. The form of the writs is not stan-
dard: They are directed to the Archdeacon of Richmond and begin "prohibemus" but 
seem to conclude with the formula of the indicavit in that they prohibit the arch-
deacon from hearing the case until the advowson question is determined in the king's 
courts. They are difficult to read and may be forgeries or miscopies by a clerk un-
familiar with royal diplomatic. One of the witnesses in this case also mentions that 
one of the parties to the original case had obtained a quare impedit. 
' 
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the case had not previously been clarified. The remaining five are 
identifiable cases that are directly prohibited-two pension,07 one 
defamation,98 one tithe,99 and one involving a ta."' imposed on a 
chantry chapel.100 
The fact that the prohibitions all seem to have been obeyed and 
the fact that with but one exception101 they all seem to have been 
directed toward preventing the hearing of cases that ought not, from 
the king's point of view, have been in the York court in the first 
place lend support to the steady, gentle pressure view. On the other 
hand, the weight of the evidence seems to point in a quite different 
direction. There are twenty-nine benefice cases over the century in 
only one of which is there even a suggestion of prohibition, five 
pension cases and only one prohibited, fourteen defamation cases 
and only one prohibited, eleven contract cases and only one pro-
hibited, 102 thirty-one tithe cases (of which an indefinite number 
violate the one-fourth-of-the-revenues rule) and, again, only one pro-
hibited. This is not a steady, gentle pressure molding the church 
courts to the king's liking but an occasional scoop of water drawn 
out of the incoming tide. 
However many prohibitions were being issued from Chancery 
97. Prior &: Convent of Blyth c. Roger de Kell<, CP.E. 250 (1383) (cum clause of 
prohibition worded: "cum placita de annuis redditibus in regno nostro Anglie ~t 
coronam et dignitatem nostram specialiter pertineant"). This form does not appear in 
EARLY Rl:GisrERS OF 'WRITS, supra note 64, nor in Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra 
note 64, but does appear in Rl:GISTRUM OMNIID.1 BREVIUM f. 38r (1595). See tm,t accom-
panying note 86 supra. This is also the form of writ found in William Chese c. Kath-
erine, widow of Henry Axiholm, CP.E. 217 (1395). This case came to the York court as 
a breach of faith case-failure to abide by an agreed upon arbitration. For this reason 
I have classified it in Table I supra as a "contract" case. The underlying dispute, how-
ever, concerned a pension. See note 248 infra. 
The encroachment of the king's courts into the area of ecclesiastical pensions in 
the fourteenth century is noted in Cheyette, Kings, Courts, Cures and Sinecures: The 
Statute of Provisors and the Common Law, 19 TRADmo 295, 336 &: n.135 (1963). 
98. Alice Pepynell c. John Ward, CP.E. '12 (1356) (prohibition de catallis et debitis). 
99. John de Tewcates [?] c. Robert del Wood, CP.E. 141 (1385) (two prohibitions de 
catallis et debitis with intervening consultation citing Articuli Cieri and permitting 
court to proceed so long as case does not deal with tithes of "great trees"). For the re• 
ceived learning on the prohibitable nature of cases concerning tithes of "great trees" 
(trees of twenty years' growth or more), see ·w. EASI'ERBY, THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF 
TITHES IN ENGLAND 50 (1888). On the prohibition de catallis et debitis, see Flahiff, 6 
MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra note 64, at 277-79; on the consultation, sec Flahilf, 7 
MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 229, supra note 64, at 239-41. 
100. Robert Lord c. Executors of Bishop of Lincoln, CP.E. 172 (1365) (form of pro-
hibition indeterminable). 
101. Robert Lord c. E."<ecutors of Bishop of Lincoln, CP.E. 172 (1365). See note 
100 supra. I can think of no compelling reason why this case should not be in an 
ecclesiastical court. It seeins to involve a challenge to the bishop's authority to im• 
pose a ta."< on the chapeL Perhaps the theory of the prohibition is that the tax affects 
the value of the income of the chantry chaplain and hence the value of the advowson, 
102. William Chese c. Katherine, widow of Henry A.'tiholm, CP.E. 21'1 (1395). Sec 
note 97 supra. 
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during this period (and a tentative examination of the public records 
for this period would indicate that the number was quite substan-
tial), 103 the small number of prohibitions received at York in propor-
tion to the number of cases being heard in violation of the king's 
jurisdictional rules could hardly have given the court the impression 
that it was being subjected to much pressure to remove such cases 
from its docket. Rather, the relatively small number of prohibitions 
received, combined with some of the details of the system's opera-
tion, must have made the system seem like an occasional, arbitrary, 
and not always effective interference with the court's exercise of its 
jurisdiction.104 For example, the jurisdiction of the church courts in 
defamation cases was a matter of some controversy. In the thirteenth 
century questions had been raised as to whether the church courts 
should be hearing such cases at alI:105 By the fourteenth century, the 
king's law conceded that the church courts could entertain defama-
tion cases, at least in some circumstances. The composition between 
Edward I and the bishops knmvn as Articuli Cleri specifically recog-
nizes ecclesiastical jurisdiction in defamation cases so long as the 
church court confines itself to ecclesiastical sanctions.106 
The reference to ecclesiastical sanctions in Articuli Cleri is 
probably intended to prevent the church courts from assessing 
money damages in defamation cases, although an earlier royal state-
ment of church court jurisdiction, known as Circumspecte Agatis, 
allows the church courts to commute corporeal penances for money 
payments.107 Further, there is a form of the prohibition ·writ (de 
difjamatione) that expressly forbids the church courts from enter-
taining defamation actions brought as a result of accusations made 
or evidence given in the royal courts.108 Thus, we might summarize 
broadly the king's courts' rule as follows: The church courts will be 
103. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 39, at 102-32. 
104. One might argue that the prohibition system was psychologically effective, even 
if it operated sporadically, because it interfered with the York court's pattern of 
orderly law enforcement. This might be called the "Chinese water torture" or the 
"waiting-for-the-other-shoe-to-fall" theory of prohibitions. The theory depends, how-
ever, on the premise that the York court viewed its role as one of law enforcement, and 
the evidence points in quite another direction. See text accompanying notes 265-73 
infra. 
105. See Flahiff, 6 :MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra note 64, at 290-91, 307 (describing 
thirteenth-century attempts to limit the jurisdiction of the church courts, so far as 
the laity were concerned, to marriage and testamentary matters). 
106. 10 Edw. 2, stat. 1, c. 4 (1316). 
107. The te."t of Circumspecte Agatis may be found in Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL Snmms 
261, supra note 64, at 312-13. The document may be dated in 1286. For an account of 
the events leading up to it, see id. at 302-09; for the problem of money damages, see id. 
at 291. See also Graves, Circumspecte Agatis, 43 ENGLISH H:IsroroCAL REv. 1 (1928). 
108. See Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL Snmms 261, supra note 64, at 281-82; Jones, supra 
note 39, at 201-02. 
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prohibited if they entertain defamation cases that might impede 
royal justice or if they attempt to assess damages for the defamation. 
But if this were the theory on which the king's courts were pro-
ceeding, the one prohibition of a defamation case109 in the cause 
papers would have given the York court no inkling of it. In the York 
papers the prohibition writ appears to be simply mistaken, since it 
says nothing about defamation, the king's courts, or money damages 
but, rather, prohibits the court from dealing with the case because 
it involves lay chattels or debts (which it does not).11° Further, the 
writ was ineffective because it was received by the York court after 
tht defendant in the case had been excommunicated. The court sim-
ply suspended proceedings and left the defendant to find a remedy 
from the king, if he could. 
There is one bit of evidence that would indicate that royal pres-
sure had some effect on the cases that the York court heard, but the 
source of that pressure was not the prohibition system. As Table 1 
indicates, more than twice as many cases survive from the decade 
1390-1399 as from any other decade; yet there are no benefice cases 
during this decade, although benefice cases make up thirteen per cent 
of the total. Now the chances of this happening just by the luck of 
the draw are about I in 1000.111 It is far more likely that the reason 
we see no benefice cases in our sample of this decade is that the num-
ber of such cases fell off drastically at this time. One possible explana-
tion for this decline would be the passage of the so-called "Great 
Statute of Praemunire."112 It has become widely accepted that this 
statute was directed, not so much against the ecclesiastical courts in 
England, as against the papal court in Rome.118 Its repercussions, 
however, may have been felt at York.114 
109. Alice Pepynell c. John Ward, CP.E. 72 (1356). 
110. See Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra note 64, at 281 n.104, for an early 
(1230) instance in which this writ is used to prohibit a defamation case. It is possible 
that this writ was used in the Pepynell case because the prohibition de diflamatione 
only dealt with•actions arising out of defamations alleged to have been made in royal 
courts (id. at 281) and not with the problem of money damages. There is, however, no 
indication that the Pepynell case involved money damages. 
111. Our expectation would be that at least 13 per cent (the lower limit of the 
confidence interval at the .90 level) of these cases would be benefice cases. In fact there 
are none, yielding a chi2 statistic of 10.3. Since .5 per cent of the distribution of a chi2 
with one degree of freedom lies beyond 7.9, and the .I per cent distribution beyond 
10.8, we may reject the hypothesis that the 1390-1399 cases show the same proportion 
of benefice cases as do the preceding years. See Appendix A infra. 
ll2. 16 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1393). 
113. The exact purpose and thrust of the statute are controverted, It seems to p).ln• 
ish those who obtain papal bulls or sentences that interfere with judgments rendered 
by the king's courts in advowson cases. See Waugh, The Great Statute of Praemunire, 
37 ENGLISH HlsroRICAL REv. 173 (1922). 
114. When we consider the fact that fully two thirds of the benefice cases heard 
March 1974] Stubbs vs. Maitland 669 
The king's victory, if such it was, was short-lived. Benefice cases 
appear again in York in the fifteenth century,115 although a casual 
examination of the records indicates that they never again became 
quite the staple of the court's jurisdiction that they were in the 
first half of the fourteenth century. Nor does the praemunire statute 
seem to have had any effect on cases, other than benefice cases, that 
the York court should not, from the point of view of the king's law, 
have been hearing. The very decade that saw the disappearance of 
benefice cases also witnessed the largest number of contract cases, 
both absolutely and in proportion to other types of cases.116 
So far, the evidence of the York cases seems to support Maitland's 
view of the role of the Roman canon law in medieval England. We 
see a church court that exercised a broader jurisdiction than the 
king's law-at least the statements of it that we find in the text of the 
prohibition writs, in various statutory instruments like Articuli 
Cleri, and in judicial statements like those in the yearbooks con-
cerning contract cases-would seem to have allowed.117 This juris-
diction rested, in large measure, on the Roman canon law's view of 
the appropriate role of the ecclesiastical courts.118 Indeed, Maitland 
might have been a bit surprised at how far the York court was able 
to go in the face of the more restrictive view that the king's law took 
of the role that it ,vas supposed to play. Let us now look more closely 
at the second relationship we proposed to examine, that between the 
York court and the Court of Rome.119 
The acta illustrate papal and royal interference operating in ap-
proximately the same way on the court. In Prior & Convent of Eccles-
field c. William Fulmer, Vicar of Ecclesfield,120 the Prior sues Fulmer 
about a tithe matter, and William is contumacious. The Prior intro-
duces evidence ex parte, and the court is prepared to render jup.g-
in the York court were bound for the papal court anyway, the effect of Praemunire 
becomes more understandable. See text accompanying notes 136-37 infra. 
115. See, e.g., Leonard de Hedon c. William de Ganton, CP.E. 11, 12 (1404); Prior&: 
Convent of Watton c. Bishop of Carlisle, CP.E. 26 (1406); Prior &: Convent of Holme 
Cultram. c. Lady Margaret de Wighton, CP .E. 53 (1410). 
116. See Table I supra. 
117. On possible royal motivation in this matter, see note 251 infra and accom-
panying text. 
118. See text accompanying notes 71, 81, 87 &: 92 supra. 
119. "Court of Rome," Curia Romana, is a shorthand found in the documents to 
refer to a number of papal institutions to which appeal might be had or cases brought 
at first instance. The "Court of Rome," during most of the fourteenth century, in fact 
sat in Avignon, where the popes resided during the "Babylonian Captivity" of the 
papacy and where the pope to whom the English adhered resided during most of the 
"Great Schism." See generally G. BARRACLOUGH, THE MEDmvAL PAPACY 140-85 (1968). 
120, M2(l)b [Dean &: Chapter Library, York], ff. Ir, Iv, 2v, 3r (two entries), 3v, 5r 
(two entries), 6v, 7r, 7v (1371). 
j 
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ment, when a priest named John of Lanercost appears and offers some 
papal letters that purport to excuse Fulmer's failure to appear. The 
judge states, and the acta are unusually full at this point, that he is 
"prepared humbly to obey apostolic mandates in all things."121 The 
next day, when Lanercost explains that he does not have authority to 
continue to represent Fulmer in the latter's absence, the judge says 
that he is prepared to do Fulmer the "complement of justice" should 
Fulmer or his proctor wish to continue the case and that he will not 
proceed without Fulmer because of the papal letters.122 By contrast, 
the final entry in Richard del See c. William de Hexham123 states 
laconically: "A royal prohibition was published and therefore-."124 
The effect was the same; in both cases the proceedings ceased. But it 
is hard not to see in the difference between the unusually full e.xpla• 
nation of the court's deference in Ecclesfield and the terse entry in 
del See a reflection of quite different attitudes to the two superior 
authorities. 
Forty-one of the sets of cause papers contain at least a stated inten• 
tion by one of the parties to appeal to the Court of Rome, and another 
three involve proceedings held after a matter had been delegated back 
to York by the pope. From the point of view of the binding quality 
of papal law these £acts are important. Even if the York court was not 
applying papal law, litigants clearly could appeal to the Court of 
Rome where that law would be applied. Further, the mention of 
papal delegation calls to mind the £act that cases may be begun before 
the pope as a matter of first instance and that these may be heard 
before delegates in the way that Maitland describes in the Drogheda 
article.126 
On the other hand, contrary to what we would e.xpect from 
reading Maitland, the York court was not simply a lower level court 
that passed all cases of any importance to the Court of Rome, or which 
all important litigants bypassed in order to begin their cases before 
the pope as a matter of first instance. We cannot, of course, tell how 
many cases began in Rome at a matter of first instance, but the York 
court was quite capable of calling litigants before it and providing 
them with a forum £or resolving their differences. However many 
cases began in Rome or were appealed to it, a number of significant 
cases began and, so far as we can tell, ended in the York court,126 and 
121. M2(l)b, f. 7r. 
122. M2(1)b, f. 7v. 
123. M2(l)b [Dean & Chapter Library, York], ff. Sv (two entries), 9r, 9v (1371). 
124. M2(l)b, f. 9v. 
125. See Maitland, supra note 23. 
126. See, e.g., Prior & Convent of St. Mary's, Carlisle c. Bishop of Carlisle, CP.E. 22 
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a number of others began elsewhere within the province and, again 
so far as we can tell, ended in the York court.127 
Further, while there are mentions of papal judges delegate in the 
York records, the small number of such mentions128 lends support to 
the suggestion that others have made that this institution was on 
the decline in the fourteenth century.129 Part of this decline may be 
attributed to the fact that more cases were being heard by the Rota 
during this period.130 Part of the explanation may, however, lie in 
the fact that, at least at York, there was a relatively efficient disputes-
resolution mechanism that could decide cases to the satisfaction of 
the parties without the trouble and expense of a trip to the conti-
nent.131 
Not only did the York court play a significant role in disputes 
resolution institutionally independent of the Court of Rome, but it 
also played a significant role in cases that were being appealed to that 
court. Thirty-one of the forty-one appeals to Rome mentioned in the 
York records are tuitorial appeals, cases in which the appellant is 
seeking the protection (tuition) of the York court pending the appeal 
to Rome. Tuitorial appeal seems to have been an institution peculiar 
to the two English archdioceses. The references to it in the papal law 
books182 are problematic, and there is no full-scale treatment of it 
to be found in any of the standard medieval treatises.133 The granting 
(1331) (prior and convent claim advowson of church by papal indult; bishop, claiming 
a papal provision, gave the church to another and refused to accept the prior and con-
vent's man; prior and convent appeal to York); Abbot &: Convent of Furness c. Official 
of Archdeacon of Richmond, CP .E. 31 (1335) (dispute concerning power of archdeacon 
to correct monks; monks, claiming papal privilege, appeal to York). 
127. See, e.g., William de Skipwith c. Robert de Rishton, CP.E. 47 (1341) (presentee 
of king sues in York court to obtain his benefice from prior incumbent, whom, he 
alleges, has been excommunicated); Katherine, daughter of Sir Ralph Paynell, Kt. c. 
Richard, son of Sir Walter Cantelupe, Kt., CP .E. 259 (1368) (divorce for impotence, 
involving two noble families). 
128. There are six sets of cause papers dealing with papal delegation: CP .E. 262 
(1331[?]): CP.E. 48 (1342); CP.E. 53 (1345); CP.E. 54 (1345); CP.E. 57 (1357 {?]); CP.E. 172 
(1365); CP .E. 243 (1379). Of these, three sets deal with requests for tuition upon appeal 
from judges delegate (48, 53-54, 57), and three with proceedings taken by the York 
court in cases delegated by the pope to the archbishop (262, 172), or the official (243). 
129. See, e.g., Pantin, The Fourteenth Century, in THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE 
PAPACY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 159, 177-78 (C. Lawrence ed. 1965). 
130. 7 DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE Rote Romaine 742 (1960). The Tribunal of 
the Holy Roman Rota ·was the principal court of the pope by the end of this period. 
131. Just how difficult the trip to Rome was is vividly described in C. CHENEY, 
FROM BECKET TO LANGTON 54-56 (1956). 
132. See X 2.28.17. 
133. The most extensive study of tuitorial appeal to date is P. Wood, Tuitorial 
Appeal to the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in the Thirteenth Century (1970) 
(unpublished M. Litt. thesis in Edinburgh University Library). See also 1 I. CHURCHILL, 
CANTERBURY AD:MINISTRATION 427-30, 460-65 (1933); B. WOODCOCK, supra note 68, at 64-67. 
P. Wood, supra, reports on a brief passage in Hostiensis' Commentaria concerning 
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of tuition, like the modem grant of a stay pending appeal, seems to 
have called for an exercise of some discretion. The extent of that dis-
cretion and precisely how the judge exercised it are questions that 
need further examination. Some of the cases seem to turn simply 
on whether the appellant had followed the proper canonic proce-
dure in taking his appeal; other cases, however, seem to involve 
an examination into the merits of the appellant's case.184 Tuition 
definitely seems to have been worth fighting for, since almost all the 
tuitorial appeal cases contain elaborate and expensive records, many 
,vi.th extensive depositions.135 It is at least possible, then, that tuitorial 
appeal was a device by which the York court was filtering appeals to 
Rome. 
Twenty of the thirty-one tuitorial appeals found among the 
York papers are in benefice cases, a far greater proportion than the 
proportion of benefice cases to the total number of cases in the 
sample,186 and these twenty cases represent more than two thirds of 
all the benefice cases found in the sample. These statistics seem to 
indicate that, however important the pope's jurisdiction as universal 
ordinary137 may have been in the fourteenth century, his power as 
the fountain of all benefices was clearly of first significance. Why, 
however, would the appellant in a benefice case be so anxious to ob-
tain tuition? Clearly, appellants must have thought that they might 
incur something akin to irreparable injury if the situation were dis-
turbed pending appeal. 
Some help in solving this problem may be found in the some-
what analogous records of significavits. When a litigant remained ex-
communicate for forty days, the bishop could ask the Chancery to 
order the sheriff to seize the excommunicate and put him in jail 
until he made his peace with the Church. Numerous records of such 
significavits, as the process of requesting the order to seize was called, 
tuitorial appeal in England. (Hostiensis' Commentaria is, unfortunately, unavailable 
to me.) Wood cites no other medieval academic commentary on the topic. Cf. Didier, 
Henri de Suse en Angleterre (1236?-1244), in 2 STUDI IN ONORE DI VINCENZO AMNGIO• 
RUIZ 333 (1953). 
134. Compare, e.g., Prior & Convent of Bridlington c. Bishop of Lincoln, CP.E. 4 
(1308) (tuition request accompanied by documents of title) and Thomas Hackness c. 
Abbot of Whitby, CP.E. 164 (1399) (tuition request opposed on grounds that abbot's 
disciplinary action against monk of Whitby was justified) with Bishop of Christopolis 
c. William de Emelden [?], CP.E, 57 (1357 [?]) (documents in support simply outline 
procedural steps taken to perfect appeal). 
135. See, e.g., cases cited in note 134 supra. 
136. 29 /232. See Table 1 supra. 
137. For a definition, see Maitland, supra note 23, at 625-35, reprinted in F. MAIT• 
LAND, supra note 19, at 100-16. 
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have survived.138 During the fourteenth century it became possible 
for the excommunicate who had appealed his excommunication to 
have the significavit quashed pending his appeal, a process that had 
an effect on the litigation like that of the granting of tuition_:._it pro-
tected the litigant for a time in order to allow him to perfect his 
appeal, if he could.189 Although some of the litigants who had the 
significavits against them quashed probably succeeded on appeal, we 
would expect that for many quashing would provide only a tem-
porary respite. Many would lose their appeals; many more would 
probably never carry their appeals through. The interesting thing 
about the records of quashed significavits is that the quashing of the 
writ seems to have provided not a temporary, but a permanent respite: 
with but a few exceptions quashed significavits were not renewed.140 
It stretches credulity to suggest that all these appellants either 
won on appeal or immediately capitulated when they lost their 
appeals or failed to perfect them. A supplementary reason must be 
found for the virtual absence of renewals of the writ. Medieval litiga-
tion was every bit as protracted as it is today and, because of the 
greater difficulties of travel and communication, even more time-
consuming.141 The advantage lay on the side of the litigant who 
could stall the process, because his opponent might well run out of 
energy or money, or both. Further, the litigant who could restore 
the status quo ante was in a far better position to bargain for· a 
compromise than one who was faced with an adverse judgment. 
These considerations apply ·with even more force to tuition in 
benefice cases than they do to quashed significavits. The litigant who 
applied for tuition in a benefice case was almost always the party 
who possessed the benefice.142 If he obtained tuition, time was on his 
side. Even if he failed to perfect his appeal, the other party had to 
reinstate the action. Further, the party with possession of the benefice 
had the income from the benefice to pay his litigation expenses and 
was in a strong position to bargain for a compromise.148 These would 
seem to be the reasons why tuition was sought, and, if they are the 
138. For a study and documentation of these records, see F. LoGAN, ExcoMMUNICA-
TION AND THE SECULAR .ARM IN MEnmvAL ENGLAND (Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies, Studies &: Texts No. 15, 1968). 
139. Id. at 116-36. 
140. Of 300 quashed significavits in the medieval period, Logan reports but five in 
which attempts were made to have the writ renewed. Id. at 132-33 &: n.75. 
141. See C. CHENEY, supra note 131. 
142. See, e.g., Peter Gabun c. Bishop of Durham, CP.E. 127 (1382); Nicholas de Hull 
c. Robert de Dightom [?], Vicar of Northallerton, CP.E. 74 (1357). 
143. See P. Wood, supra note 133, at 90-111. 
674 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 72:647 
correct reasons, the grant or denial of tuitorial appeal by the York 
court may, as a practical matter, have been as important a step in the 
litigation process as the appeal to the Roman court on which the 
grant of tuition was based. 
The appeal route from the York court to the Court of Rome 
was not, of course, the only contact between the York court and 
Roman canon law. There was, as well, the law itself as it was em-
bodied in the papal law books and a multitude of commentaries. To 
what extent was this law being applied by the York court? 
Because most of the cases heard by the York court were either 
abandoned or compromised and because those that did reach the sen-
tence stage were decided without citation of authority, the law being 
applied by the court must be determined by inference from the 
pleadings and from the facts developed in the depositions. Nonethe-
less, there can be little doubt that, where papal law was directly 
relevant to the substantive issue of the case at hand, the York court 
regarded that law as binding and applied it to the case. For example, 
a careful examination of the twenty-one sets of marriage cause papers 
dating from the first half of the century reveals but two decisions the 
substance of which are not fully supported by Book IV of the Decre-
tals, the relevant papal law book.144 Of the two exceptions, one in-
volves a decision by an archdeacon's official who seems to have been a 
bit confused about the canonic age of consent.146 But, as Maitland 
warns us,146 in inferior courts you must expect inferior law, and the 
case was appealed to the York court. The second exception147 involves 
not a contradiction (at least on its face) of papal law, but an addition 
to it, the custom of abjuration sub pena nubendi.148 
Apart from the marriage cases, we still find very few cases in 
which the court seems to be applying a substantive law contrary to 
papal law, but many cases tum on matters that the papal law either 
does not cover or covers in the most general of terms. For example, 
144. See Donahue, The Policy of Alexander Ill's Consent Theory of Marriage, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIF.ra INTERNATIONAL CONGRFSS OF l\fEDIEVAL CANON LAW (S. Kuttner 
ed. forthcoming). 
145. Alice de Draycott c. William Crane, CP.E. 23 (1332). 
146. Maitland, supra note 20, at 473, reprinted in F. MArrr..AND, supra note 19, at 43. 
147. Matilda de Bugthorp c. Walter Cole, CP.E. 6 (1311). 
148. When a man and woman capable of marrying each other were found guilty 
of fornication, they were frequently required to exchange words of consent of matri• 
mony in this form: "I take thee as husband (wife) if I have further carnal knowledge 
of thee." Under the prevailing marriage law such an exchange of consent automatically 
became a valid marriage if the condition were fulfilled. See generally Helmholz, Ab· 
juration Sub Pena Nubendi in the Church Courts in Medieval England, ll2 THE JURIST 
80 (1972). 
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there is practically nothing in the papal law books149 on the topic of 
defamation; yet defamation cases make up roughly six per cent of our 
total. The court was basing its authority to hear these cases on a 
provincial constitution,150 as can be seen from the fact that the plain-
tiffs in such cases invariably ask that the court pronounce upon the 
defendant the sentence of major excommunication that was decreed 
by the Holy Synod of York against defamers.151 To the extent that 
the substantive law applied in these cases cannot be found in the 
constitution it seems to have been developed on a case-by-case basis 
by the court.152 
Other cases turn, not on local legislation, but on local custom. 
For example, in the trespass case the plaintiff153 specifically invokes 
the praiseworthy (a term of art apparently necessary for validity) 
custom of the York archdiocese that cemeteries belong to the church 
to which they are attached.154 Other cases involve both local legisla-
tion and custom in combination. For example, the pleadings in the 
tuitorial appeal cases sometimes invoke the praiseworthy statutes 
and customs of the Court of York regarding such appeals.155 Some 
cases involve customs so well engrained that they are not specifically 
invoked. The cases of abjuration sub pena nubendi may fall into this 
category, although there are provincial constitutions on the topic.156 
By and large, the validity of these local customs and ordinances 
is accepted without challenge. One specific challenge to an alleged 
custom is based, not on the fact that it is contrary to a specific papal 
law, but on the most general of policy grounds.157 The case is one in 
which the inhabitants of a village allege that the rector of a nearby 
church has customarily provided a chaplain to serve a chapel in the 
149. That is, the Decretals, Sext, and Clementines. Cf. X 5.26.1; X 5.36.9 (both only 
tangentially related to problem). 
150. The provincial constitution is Synodal Statutes of the Diocese of York [c. 42] 
(date uncertain, but before 1276). See 1 F. Pow1cKE &: C. CHENEY, supra note 39, at 496. 
151. "Petit [actor reum] in sentenciam maioris excommunicationis sacrosancta synodo 
Ebor' contra diffamatores et crimen impositores proinde latam et promulgatam • • ." 
is the standard form. See, e.g., Alice Pepynell c. John Ward, CP.E. 72 (1356). 
152. See Helmholz, supra note 47. See also W. LYNDWOOD, supra note 46, lib. 5, tit. 
17, c.[l] (Auctoritate Dei Patris), and accompanying glosses. There is, however, no evi-
dence that this development occurred through the conscious adherence to the prece-
dents established in prior judgments. See text accompanying notes 177-81 infra. 
153. I translate actor and reus as "plaintiff" and "defendant," respectively through-
out. The connotations of the English don't quite fit the Latin, but any alternative 
seemed precious. 
154. Prior &: Convent of Newburgh c. William Trolley, CP .E. 75 (1357). 
155. Set;, e.g., William Pulkowe c. Prior of Haltemprice, CP .E. 64 (1352). 
156. Helmholz, supra note 148, at 81 &: n.3. 
157. Inhabitants of Subholme c. William Rowdon, CP.E. 151, 183, 260 (1389). 
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village. The custom alleged, the rector counters, is not "praise-
worthy" but "damnable." The inhabitants of the area do not need a 
chaplain, and if the rector were compelled to provide one, a diver-
sion of funds that could be better put to other uses would result. 
Closely related to the concept of custom is the concept of the pos-
session of rights.158 Many cases turn on this latter concept, frequently 
allied ·with an invocation of immemorial custom (prescription of 
rights).159 For example, the two most frequently litigated issues in 
the tithe cases are whether tithes are owing from somewhat specialized 
activities-such as coal mining160 or salmon fishing161 or dairy farm-
ing162-and to whom the tithe from a tithable item was owed. The 
first issue is by and large conceded by papal law to be a matter of 
local custom.163 The second usually is a local matter, at least in the 
York cases, because of the nature of the issue: It usually involves the 
location of parish boundaries.164 The pleadings and depositions in 
tithe cases illustrate the interplay of the concepts of custom, and 
possession and prescription of rights in tithe litigation. The plaintiff 
alleges that the defendant has withheld or despoiled him of tithes, 
the right or quasi-right to which the plaintiff and his predecessors have 
peaceably possessed.165 The depositions, frequently with many wit-
nesses, seek to elicit testimony on both sides of this proposition with, 
where it is relevant, further testimony on the location of parish 
boundaries.166 Similarly, in the jurisdiction cases, the litigated issue 
sometimes is not whether the official who has attempted to exercise 
his jurisdiction against the plaintiff has that jurisdiction as a matter 
of the common law of the Church or papal exemption, but whether 
the plaintiff has established a prescriptive right against the official 
to be free from the official's jurisdiction.167 
158. This is the idea that one's exercise of a right will be protected in somewhat 
the same fashion that one's possession of a thing will be protected-without proof of 
title. For a discussion of this concept, see C. BRUNS, DAS RECHT DES l3ESITZES §§ 24-26 
(1848); E. FINZI, IL POSSESSO DEI D1rurn (1915). 
159. For a discussion of this concept, see BRUNS, supra note 158, and sources cited 
therein. 
160. E.g., Ralph Elys c. John Bolhall, CP.E. 162 (1397). 
161. E.g., Prior & Convent of Durham c. John Lokyk, CP.E. 96 (1367). 
162. E.g., William Mowbray, Rector of Normanby c. Thomas de Crathornc, CP,E. 
177 (1390). 
163. 4 DICTIONAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE Dime 1231, 1233 (1949). 
164. E.g., Ralph, Vicar of Leeds c. John Aylsy, CP.E. 55 (1345); Hugh de Saxton c. 
Roger de Darrington, CP.E. 67 (1354). 
165. E.g., Prior & Convent of Pontefract c. Richard de Walton, CP.E. 9, IO, 18 (1317), 
166. The cases cited in note 164 supra contain particularly good examples. 
167. E.g., Rector & Parishioners of Hemingsborough c. Prior of Durham, CP.E. 6B 
(1354). 
March 1974] Stubbs vs. Maitland 677 
The pleadings in a pension case'168 illustrate well the blending of 
the concepts of possession of quasi-rights and immemorial custom. 
The Prior and Convent of Blyth allege that Roger, the Rector of 
Elton, owes them an annual pension of 26s.8d., 
by reasonable custom, properly prescriptive, peacefully and un-
interruptedly observed for the entire time aforesaid [sic-"below 
said" is probably meant], founded on just cause and of sufficient 
antiquity, and [paid] by the rectors of the said church of Elton 
who succeeded each other from 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 years, and 
within, beyond and through these periods and from time and 
through time the contrary of which memory of these [things] does 
not exist ..•. [Further,] the said religious [the Prior and Convent] 
were in full, sufficient, canonic and peaceable possession of the [right] 
or quasi-right of receiving and having the aforesaid annual pension 
in the name of their aforesaid monastery, and actually received it and 
had it, and were accustomed to receive it and have it from each 
rector of the said church who was successively in that church, the 
Archbishops and Dean and Chapter of York •.. knowing, wanting 
to know and not contradicting but tolerating and approving both 
tacitly and expressly for each and every period aforesaid up to the 
time of the above written nonpayment and spoliation .... 169 
It should be emphasized that all of this is not contrary to papal 
law. Papal law specifically recognizes the validity of local legislation 
when that legislation is not contrary to the common law· of the 
church;170 it recognizes the validity of custom supplementary to and 
in some instances contrary to the common law;171 and it authorizes 
possessors not only of things but also of rights or quasi-rights to 
bring possessory actions to recover those rights without having to 
prove title.172 The fact remains, however, that the existence of these 
168. Prior&: Convent of Blyth c. Roger Kelk, CP.E. 250 (1384). 
169. The portion of the articles translated above reads: 
ex consuetudine racionabili legitime prescripta ac per om.nia et singula tempora 
supradi<;ta pacifice et inconcusse observata et ex causa justa et sufficientis antiquitus 
legitime constituta, ac a rectoribus dicte ecclesie de Elton [soluta] qui successive 
fuerunt a x.xx.xxx.xl.1.lx. annis, ac citra et ultra et per ipsa tempora necnon a 
tempore et per tempus cuius contrarium memoria harum non existet • . . . [D]icti 
religiosi fuerunt in plena sufficienti canonica et pacifica possessione [juris] vel quasi 
juris percipiendi et habendi nomine monasterii sui predicti dictam annuam pen• 
sionem et eam actualiter perceperunt et habuerunt et percipere et habere 
consueverunt a singulis rectoribus ipsius ecclesie qui successive fuerunt in ipsa 
ecclesia, archiepiscopis, decano et capitulo Ebor' . • . scientibus, scire volentibus, 
et non contra dicentibus, set tolerantibus et approbantibus tam tacite quam expresse 
per omnia et singula tempora supradicta usque ad tempora subtractionis et 
spoliacionis suprascripte •••• 
Prior &: Convent of Blyth c. Roger Kelk, CP .E. 250 (1384). This case was prohibited. 
See note 97 supra. 
170. See W. LYNDWO0D, supra note 46, lib. 5, tit. 14, c.[l] (Presbyteri), gloss on 
furamento. 
171. See R. WEHRLE, DE LA C0UTU!IIE DANS LE DROIT CANONIQUE 100-252 (1928). 
172. See C. BRUNS, supra note 158. 
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general principles in the papal law books makes the remaining con-
tents of those books irrelevant to the substantive decision in close 
to half the cases in our sample.178 
In summary, if we frame the question of the authority of the 
canon law in the English church courts in the terms in which Stubbs 
and Maitland chose to frame it, then Maitland was right; the papal 
law was binding. If, however, we regard "law," not as a series of gen-
eral propositions to which judges give assent, but rather as the set of 
rules by which they resolve actual cases, then Stubbs and Maitland 
were asking the ·wrong question. The question is not "Was papal law 
binding?" It is, in a great many cases, "Was it law?" 
When we turn from substantive law to adjective law, the situa-
tion becomes even more confused. There is a great deal in the papal 
law books about procedure, and the system of procedure described 
in them is highly sophisticated, complex, and subject to numerous 
detailed rules. There is evidence, however, that the procedure had 
become too complicated to be useful, particularly in simple cases, by 
the end of the thirteenth century, and Clement V, in a bull of wide-
ranging implications, gave general authorization for the courts to 
simplify the procedure in those cases that called for more "summary" 
treatment.174 
The procedure followed by the York court is clearly recognizable 
as canonic procedure. On the other hand, there is much in it that 
cannot be explained solely by reference to the papal law books.11u To 
what extent these deviations can be explained by legitimate local 
custom and the changes authorized by Clement V and to what ex-
tent they must be regarded as violations, conscious or unconscious, 
of papal law are questions that require further research 
III. How WAS THE PAPAL LAw UsED? 
The picture that we have drawn of the York court so far is one of 
an institution-and, if the York example proves valid for the whole, 
173. That is, most of the cases other than the marriage cases. See Table I supra. 
174. See 7 D1cnoNNAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE Procedure 282, 295 (1959). The! bull 
is Saepe Contingit, CLEM. 5.11.2. Cf. CLEM. 2.1.2. 
175. For example, the papal law seemed to hold that, with some exceptions, the 
testimony of women and serfs was inadmissible. See P. FOURNIER, supra note 87, at 185; 
TANCREDUS, ORDO JUDICIARIUS, in PILU, TANCREDI, GRATIAE LIBRI DE JUDICIORUllf ORDINE 
96,232 (F. Bergmann ed. 1842). Yet we find a number of cases in which women testify, 
seemingly without objection, including one (Thomas de Newton c. Richard de Monte, 
CP.E. 16 (1327) (deposition of Agnes de Sanndby)) in which a woman testifies in a tcsta• 
mentary case in direct violation of the church's common law (see TANCREDUS, supra, at 
223), and a number of cases in which people who are at least accused of being serfs 
testify (see, e.g., John Button c. Alice Reyny, CP.E. 92 (1365)). It is not always easy to 
tell how the court reacted to these accusations, but in the latter case it seems to have 
gone ahead, in the face of strong evidence that the witnesses were serfs, and rendered 
judgment on the basis of their testimony. 
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of a set of instit1,1tions-quite independent of both pope and king. 
There were, of course, institutional limits. The writs of prohibition 
that we find in the York cause papers seem to have been obeyed, and 
there was never any question that any party to a case had the right 
to appeal to the Court of Rome. The over-all impression remains, 
however, of an institution both stronger and more independent than 
a reading of Stubbs or Maitland would lead us to expect. 
Stubbs' arguments lead us to expect to find that the medieval 
English church courts were strong institutions because the Roman 
canon law was not binding on them. The source of the strength, so 
we might infer, would lie in the fact that these courts were not closely 
identified with the pope but were dependent on the king. Maitland's 
arguments, on the other hand, would lead us to expect that the 
church courts were weak because the canon law was binding. They 
would be in conflict with the king because of their identification with 
the pope, and the king, so we might infer, would ultimately tri-
umph because of his greater power. The evidence of the York court 
seems to suggest that the institution was strong, quite independent, 
and attractive to litigants, and that the canon law was binding. One 
reason for this seeming paradox may be that the binding quality of 
the canon law did not result in a close institutional identification be-
tween the local church courts and the papal court nor between the 
law that the church courts applied and papal law. Another possible 
reason, as we will suggest in the conclusion, may be that the func-
tion of the institution was not to enforce the law but to resolve dis-
putes. But before we get to that we have to examine more closely just 
how the papal law bound the court. 
We have also discovered that the sources of law for the York 
court were far more diverse than Maitland would lead us to suspect. 
Local legislation and local custom play considerably larger roles in 
actual litigation than Maitland, relying on Lyndwood, suggests176 
that they did. On the other hand, there is little to suggest, as Stubbs 
would have us believe, that the York court felt that it could choose 
to ignore papal law in those situations to which it applied. The ques-
tion remains: Was papal law "absolutely binding statute law," as 
Maitland calls it, or .were the papal law books collections of cases, 
as Stubbs and Kemp prefer to call them?177 
Neither Maitland nor Stubbs and Kemp fully develop the impli-
cations of this distinction for the central question, the binding nature 
of papal law. Maitland's reference to "absolutely binding statute law" 
176. Maitland, supra note 20, at 473-74, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 
41-43. 
177. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
680 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:647 
implies a view of the legal process by which a judge, faced with a 
binding statute, automatically applies the dictates of that statute to 
the case before him. The judge in this situation is not a law-maker, 
either in the Anglo-American sense that his judgments create prece-
dents on which future judges rely or in the more narrow sense that 
he manipulates the inherently ambiguous dictates of the law to 
fashion a rule that does justice to the parties before him. When 
Stubbs and Kemp suggest that the papal law collections were case-
books, they seem to imply that cases are less binding than statutes, 
that the judge has more flexibility in applying case law than he does 
in applying statute law, and perhaps that each judgment of an 
English ecclesiastical judge, unless overruled by a higher court, is to 
form a precedent for use in future judgments. 
One of the implications of these arguments can be treated sum-
marily. There is no evidence from this period that the judgments of 
the English ecclesiastical courts were regarded as precedent. To the 
author's knowledge, there are no collections of such judgments in a 
form that would in any way suggest that they were regarded as prece-
dent nor any record of their having been cited as authority, either in 
actual cases or in academic commentary. If Stubbs and Kemp mean to 
imply that English ecclesiastical court judges made law by their 
judgments in the way that an Anglo-American common law judge 
makes law, that implication is not supported by the evidence. 
There remains, however, the question of the appropriate char-
acterization of the papal law books and the further question of what 
that characterization means for the way in which the law was applied. 
Let us look first to the papal law books themselves to see whether 
they are more appropriately categorized as statutes or as collections of 
cases, next to the academic law to see how contemporaries thought 
they should be used, and finally to some evidence of how they actu-
ally were used. 
The Gregorian Decretals contain a number of canons of Coun-
cils, particularly the Third and Fourth Lateran Councils,178 and 
the Clementines consists almost entirely of canons of the Council 
of Vienne.179 These are statutes pretty much in the modem sense of 
the term. On the other hand, the vast bulk of the Decretals and 
hence the vast bulk of the papal law books180 consists of decisions by· 
the pope in actual cases heard before him, opinions in actual cases re-
178. For a listing of the decretals drawn from canons of the Third and Fourth 
Lateran Councils, see 2 CoRl'US Jurus CANONICI, supra note 14, at xii. 
179. See note 14 supra. 
180. The Sext and Clementines are quite small in comparison, 
March 1974] Stubbs vs. Maitland 681 
£erred to him, or answers to hypothetical cases posed to him by 
bishops, roughly equivalent to the decreta, subscriptiones and 
epistulae of the Roman law.181 Frequently the compilers have edited 
these documents, usually, however, not beyond the point of recogni-
tion. It is clear from the fact that they were collected that these decre-
tal letters were regarded as highly authoritative, and their collection, 
arrangement, and promulgation in official, and, in the case of the 
Decretals and the Sext, exclusive182 texts made them even more au-
thoritative, in fact if not in law. But both cases and statutes can be 
authoritative, and the fact that the papal law collections were au-
thoritative does not make them any more or less like statutes or like 
cases. 
In fact, the distinction between statute books and case books is 
somewhat anachronistic when applied to the medieval papal law 
books. Since neither statute books nor case books existed in the 
thirteenth or fourteenth centuries, the distinction between the two 
was unknown to Gregory IX, Boniface VIII, John XXII, or their 
compilers.183 What the papal law books are is authoritative collec-
tions of canons, partaking something of the nature of Justinian's 
Digest and more of the nature of his Code and Novels.184 If we de-
fine a statute or code as an authoritative, orderly statement of legal 
rules that is at once as concise and as general as possible, we will cer-
tainly not regard the papal law books as books of statutes. What 
order they have is imposed by the compilers and is not inherent in the 
texts themselves. Many of the texts lack both generality and concise-
ness because of the presence of much material about the controversy 
out of which they arose. If, on the other hand, we define a case book as 
a collection of reasoned opinions deciding results of specific contro-
versies and striving both to do justice in the individual case and to 
set a precedent for the decision of similar cases, then the papal law 
books are not case books either.185 They rarely contain reasoned 
181. On the Roman law, see H. JoLOWICZ &: B. NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
TO THE STUDY OF RoMAN LAW 368-70 (3d ed. 1972). 
182. See the bulls of promulgation cited in note 186 infra. 
183. Indeed, it might be argued that some notion of separation of powers, or at 
least of functions, is necessary for the distinction to be operative. At least, it is hardly 
conducive to the development of the distinction to have the functions of supreme court 
and law-giver combined in one man, as they were in the case of the pope. 
184. The analogy was perceived by the canon lawyers of the time, although the 
tendency was to analogize Gratian's Decretum to the Digest and the Decretals to the 
Code. See Kuttner, Quelques Observations sur l'Autorite des Collections Canoniques 
dans le Droit Classique de l'Eglise in AcrES DU CONGRES DE DROIT CANONIQUE, CINQUAN-
TENAIRE DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT CANONIQUE, PARIS, 22-26 AVRIL 1947, at 305, 308 (1949). 
185. The reader who has read at all in the theory of the sources of law will recog-
nize at once the folly of attempting brief general definitions of "case" or "statute." In 
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opinions; they frequently do not contain enough facts about the 
case to allow us to determine the precise holding (this is, of course, 
particularly true of the genuinely statutory material and the answers 
to hypothetical questions); and they rarely show much adherence to 
the doctrine of precedent. 
If the nature of the papal law collections leaves us in doubt as 
to whether their contents are to be regarded as more like modern 
cases or more like modem statutes, the books themselves give us 
even less help as to how they are to be used. The bulls of promulga-
tion, 186 for example, say nothing of how the books are to be used, 
only that they are to be used by the law schools and the courts. 
There is, however, a considerable body of learning outside the 
papal law books on the use of the decretals. It states, for example, 
that only the dispositive part of a decretal has legal force, not the 
statement of facts or the arguments or even the rationale. Further, 
the rubrics have legal force, if they do not contradict the black 
letter.187 This learning unfortunately doesn't help us much. In the 
first place, much of it is the product of the· postmedieval period. 
Second, it is itself somewhat ambiguous: At times the insistence that 
the dispositive part of the decretal has the sole vis legalis seems to 
imply that the decretals are in fact a code with a great deal of un-
necessary verbiage added, while at other times, it seems to approach 
jurisdictions where there exists a separation of judicial and legislative functions a 
rough approximation of definitions can be achieved by saying that cases arc what arc 
decided by the judiciary and statutes are what emanates from the legislature. The 
roughness of the approximation is apparent: Are private bills or impeachment resolu• 
tions "statutes"? Are general procedural rules promulgated by a court "cases"? The 
definitional problem is even more severe in jurisdictions where the judicial and lcgisla• 
tive functions are not separated or are imperfectly separated. See note 183 supra. Yet 
the notion persists that the distinction between "case law" and "statute law" is a useful 
one, as the use of the terms in the Stubbs-Maitland literature illustrates. But cf. Dib• 
din, supra note 31, at 420-23, for a suggestion of the limited usefulness of the distinction 
in this context. My attempt at definition in the text reflects the influence of J. GRAY, 
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF !.Aw 152-259 (1963). 
Partially as a result of my attempt to grapple with the case-statute distinction in 
the conte.xt of. the medieval English canon law, I have come to the conclusion that 
efforts to clarify the distinction frequently divert attention from two more fundamental 
issues: How are authoritative legal texts actually used by decision makers, and what is 
the nature of the judicial function? See text between notes 242-43 infra and te.xt accom• 
panying notes 265-73 infra. 
186. Rex Pacificus, X, in 2 CORPUS JURIS CANONIC!, supra note 14, at 1-4: Sacro• 
sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, VI, in id. at 933-36; Quoniam nulla, CLEM. in id. at 1129-32, 
187. See A. VAN HovE, supra note 10, at 360-61, 365-66; G. LE BRAs, C. LEFEBRE &: 
J. R.AMBAUD, L'.A.GE CLASSIQUE 1140-1378, at 240-43, 250-51, 253 (Histoire du Droit ct 
des Institutions de l'Englise en Occident No. 7, 1965); sources cited in both. But cf. 
Kuttner, supra note 184; Ielicic, De Mente Gregorii IX in Adornanda Collectionc 
Decretalium, in 3 AcrA CONGRESSUS IuRIDICI INTERNATIONALIS VII SAECULO A DECRETALI• 
BUS GREGORI! IX ET XIV A C0DICE IUSTINEANO PROMULGA1lS, R.OIIIAE, 12-17 NOVEMDJUS 
1934, at 3 (1936). 
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the common law notion that only the holding of a case is binding. 
Third, there are indications that these notions were not strictly fol-
lowed throughout the Middle Ages. For example, despite the fact 
that even the bulls of promulgation seem to preclude the use of decre-
tal material outside the Decretals and the Sext,188 the authors of the 
ordinary gloss189 may be found using such material. ' 
Thus, neither the nature of the papal law collections nor the 
statements as to how they were to be used give us much help in 
determining how they should have been applied in the English 
church courts themselves, much less how they actually were applied. 
A more fruitful way of determining how they were applied is to 
look to the way in which they were used in the courts. Unfortunately, 
the evidence here is most thin. English canon law judges in the 
Middle Ages, like their secular counterparts for most of the period,190 
did not generally give reasoned opinions. Fu:ther, and even more 
unfortunately, we are lacking any regular record of legal argument, 
like that found in the yearbooks, for the ecclesiastical courts. Time 
and again the acta will tell us that there was an extended dispute 
about a matter,191 but rarely do we leam the nature of the dispute. 
A few documents that have survived from the thirteenth-century 
ecclesiastical courts at Canterbury do contain arguments of counsel. 
Of course, the way a fawyer uses authority in a brief is not neces-
sarily the way a judge uses it in arriving at a judgment. On the other 
hand, we may assume that a lawyer intends to convince a judge by 
his arguments. If he uses authorities that are not authoritative or 
uses proper authorities in a way that is impermissible, he might as 
well not bother to ·write the brief; the judge will just not be con-
vinced. These Canterbury "briefs," then, may give us some idea of 
what authorities were being used in the English courts Christian and, 
hence, the extent to which the papal law collections were the exclu-
188. E.g.: "Volentes igitur, ut hac tantum compilatione universi utantur in iudiciis 
et in scholis, distrlctius prohibemus, ne quis praesumat aliam facere absque auctoritate 
sedis apostolicae speciali." Rex Pacificus, supra note 186, at 4. 
189. E.g., X 2.19.6, gloss on partibus, suggests that the compilers distorted the mean-
ing of the decretal by what they left out. For explanation of the "ordinary gloss," see 
note 213 infra. For edition used, see note 14 supra. 
190. See J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 50-54 (1968). 
191. Habita disputado diutina is the standard phrase. See Donahue &: Gordus, A 
Case from Archbishop Stratford's Audience Act Book and Some Comments on the Book 
and Its Value, 2 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 45, 56 (1972). These entries, coupled with 
the fact that the academic canon law indicates that the advocate is to make a legal 
argument at the close of the case (see, e.g., TANCREDUS, supra note 175, at 263-67), indi-
cate that legal arguments were made before the ecclesiastical courts. Like the yearbook 
arguments, they seem, as a rule, to have been made orally, but, unlike the yearbook ar-
guments, they were not recorded and so have been lost to us. 
r 
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sive authority in the areas to which they applied. They may also give 
us some idea of the extent to which and the ways in which the papal 
law collections could be manipulated and, hence, how they were 
binding on the English courts Christian. 
Two of the surviving Canterbury "briefs" are of particular inter-
est. The first is contained in a set of documents from Robert de 
Picheford c. Thomas de Nevill192 and can be dated between April 
1269 and the autumn of 1270. Thomas de Nevill, in 1267, com-
plained to the legate Ottobono that he had· been presented to the 
church of Houghton in Leicestershire and instituted and inducted to 
the same. Master Robert de Picheford claimed presentation to the 
same church by a different patron and also institution and induction. 
Ottobono delegated the case to the Prior of Bradley, who rendered 
judgment in favor of Thomas. Robert appealed to the legate, who 
delegated the case to the priors of St. James and St. John near 
Northampton and then left the country. While this appeal was pend-
ing, so Robert claimed, the Prior of Bradley put his sentence into 
execution. At this point Robert appealed to Rome and to the Court 
of Canterbury for tuition. The documents that we have include 
Robert's raciones103 Qiterally, "reasons") and supplementary raci-
ones194 attacking the action of the Prior of Bradley before the Official 
of the Court of Canterbury. 
While the details of Robert's arguments are not always easy to 
follow, their basic outline appears to be as follows: (1) The proceed-
ings before the Prior of Bradley were void because Robert was not 
properly cited and had no notice of them; (2) the Prior had no power 
to put his sentence into execution because his authority did not in-
clude the power to institute to a benefice;196 and (3) in any event, 
the Prior should not have acted while an appeal was pending, and 
therefore Robert should be restored to possession. Robert was ulti-
mately successful, although we cannot tell which argument or combi-
nation of arguments the court found dispositive. 
In Robert's raciones there are three citations to the Dec.return, 
fourteen citations to the Decretals (two of which are repeated), five 
192. Documents from this case are scattered in various classifications of the Cathe• 
dral Archives and Library, Canterbury: Ecclesiastical Suit Rolls Nos. 4i-iii, 7-8, 9i-iii, 
18, 226, 331, 340; Sede Vacante Scrapbooks Nos. I at 132, II at 50, 64, III at 314; Chartac 
Antiquae B398a, Zl52, Zl83. The case is one of the cases that will be printed in Pro-
fessor Norma Adams' forthcoming Selden Society volume of select Canterbury cases 
from the thirteenth century. I am most grateful to Professor Adams for allowing me 
to make use of her typescript of the case in preparing this article. 
193. Ecclesiastical Suit Roll No. 4iii. 
194. Ecclesiastical Suit Roll No. 131. 
195. See note 70 supra. 
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citations to the legatine constitutions196 (two of which are repeated), 
and ten citations to Roman law (three of which are repeated). The 
Roman law citations include three to the Digest, three to the Code, 
three to the Novels, and one to the Institutes. 
The second "brief" comes from a marriage case, John of Elham 
c. Alice, daughter of Richard Cissor [Tailor?],197 and may be dated 
some time late in 1293 or in early 1294. It is a less formal document 
than the arguments in Picheford c. Nevill and is headed simply "for 
the information of the lord judge in sentencing." It contains argu-
ments both of fact and law relevant to Alice's basic defense: that 
she had not freely consented to marry John. Although Alice seems 
ultimately to have lost the_ case, we cannot tell whether it was the 
legal arguments that failed to persuade the judge or whether he 
simply did not believe that Alice had made out her case as a factual 
matter. The arguments contai!)- eight citations to the Decretals, one 
to the Digest, and one to the Summa of Geoffrey of Trani.198 
So few actual medieval canonic arguments with citations of au-
thority survive199 that one cannot be sure how typical this list of 
authorities is of actual court arguments of the period. Clearly, how-
ever, there is nothing in the lists of authorities in these briefs that 
should surprise the reader of medieval academic canon law writing. 
All of the authorities mentioned are in the romano-canonic tradi-
tion, but the papal law books are clearly not the only permissible 
authority. Particularly notable is the number of citations to Roman 
law in Robert's procedural arguments, citations not only to basic 
principles contained in the Digest and Institutes but also to detailed 
statutory regulations in the Code and Novels.200 There are also a 
number of citations to commentary rather than to authoritative 
texts. Sometimes these citations are apparent from the text of the 
citation itself, such as Alice's citation to Geoffrey of Trani's Summa; 
sometimes we must look to the cited source in order to discover that 
196. That is, the canons promulgated by the provincial councils held under the au-
thority of the papal legates Otto and Ottobono. See F. POWICKE, THE THIRTEENTH 
CENTURY 451 (Oxford History of England No. 4, 2d ed. 1962). 
197. Sede Vacante Scrap Book No. III at 61 (no. 128), 62 (nos. 130-32). Number 131 
is the "brief." It is transcribed in Appendix B infra. I am indebted to R.H. Helmholz 
for calling my attention to this document. 
198. GEOFFREDUS TRANENSIS, SUMMA IN TITULOS DECRETALIUM (1563). 
199. Silvestre, Dix Plaidoiries Indedites du XIIe Siecle, 10 TRADmo 373 (1954), con-
tains ten Belgian canonic arguments from the twelfth century with authorities cited. 
The editor, however, believes that these documents were not actually used in litigation 
but were school exercises-roughly equivalent to moot court briefs of our own day. 
200. E.g., CODE 2.1.7; NoVELS 119.3. A summary of the thirteenth-century contro-
versy over Roman law as an authority in the canonic courts and as a topic of study in 
the universities may be found in A. VAN HOVE, supra note 10, at 456-67, 523-28. 
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the citation is not to the authoritative text but to the accompanying 
marginal commentary.201 The impression left by the breadth of the 
citations is not that there was a single authoritative text to which 
all arguments must be directed but rather that there was a large 
group of texts and commentary from which each counsel picked his 
authorities to suit his argument. In each of these respects the use of 
the authorities is similar to that made in such academic writing as 
the glosses to the Decretals or any of the numerous treatises of the 
period.202 
In order to get some idea how and to what extent the authorities, 
particularly the papal law collections, were being manipulated and, 
hence, how they were binding, let us exami1,1e one of the arguments 
in the marriage case. The examination must necessarily be somewhat 
lengthy, since it is only as the argument unfolds that we can get some 
idea of the different kinds of arguments being made, the assump• 
tions under which they are made, and, ultimately, and most impor-
tantly, how far from the letter of the papal texts, or even the ac-
companying commentary, we are being led. 
Alice's counsel203 has alleged that four of his witnesses testified to 
the proposition that Alice was forced into the marriage contract. He 
now has to deal ·with the argument made by John's counsel that this 
testimony should not have been admitted because Alice had sub-
mitted her articles, written offers of proof, after the testimony of 
John's witnesses had been published. This argument addresses an 
issue that troubled the canonic courts and commentators throughout 
the thirteenth century and beyond.204 Under canonic procedure a 
party who wished to prove a point submitted to the judge written 
articles outlining what he wished to prove. The witnesses were then 
examined by the judge or other court official separately and in pri-
vate, and their testimony was reduced to writing. When all the testi-
mony was in, it was published in open court, and copies of it were 
given to each party.205 Because of the fear that the opposing party 
would suborn perjurious testimony to the contrary, canon law, 
201. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 214-16 infra. 
202. E.g., GOFFREDUS TRANENSIS, supra note 198. 
203. Whether the author of this document was a proctor or an advocate we do not 
know. Woodcock reports that the distinction between the two does not seem to have 
been observed in the Canterbury Consistory Court. B. ·wooncocK, supra note 68, at 42, 
We can avoid the problem by calling him "Alice's counsel." 
204. See, e.g., material cited in notes 210, 214, 217-22 infra. See also CLEM. 2,8,2 and 
accompanying glosses for a treatment of the problem some two decades after the 
Elham case. 
205. A basic description of this procedure may be found in P. FOURNIER, supra note 
87, at 189-92. 
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following Roman law, developed the notion that once the testimony 
about a given matter had been published no more evidence could be 
introduced on that matter.206 
The principle was well established, but the difficulty came in 
devising a verbal formula that defined how far the bar on the intro-
duction of more evidence extended. Did it encompass other proceed-
ings in which the same issue was raised? Did it encompass what today 
we would call affirmative defenses? The issue was particularly trouble-
some in marriage cases, because the more that procedural rules inter-
fered with getting to the truth of the matter, the more likely it was 
that undesirable conflicts would rise between the external forum, 
the forum of the courts, and the internal forum, the forum of con-
science.207 Here is how Alice's counsel argues that the bar should not 
extend to the offer of proof of force after the publication of testimony 
concerning the marriage contract:208 
So far as the argument of the plaintiff is concerned-that this defense 
and its proof should not be allowed to stand because it is an article 
contrary to the first and witnesses to such an article cannot be intro-
duced after the publication of the testimony about the first-what 
he says about such articles is true but not relevant. There are four 
types of articles that should be considered ·with regard to the present 
matter: the same article or one completely contrary, one that com-
pletely and directly destroys the first, and about neither of these can 
there be a produ.ction of witnesses after the testimony about the first 
article has been published. X 2.20.38; X 2.19.6; and similar authori-
ties. There are also articles completely diverse from the first but 
not contrary to it, and there is a fourth type of article that depends 
on the first, supposes the first and adds something to it, but does 
not completely destroy it. X 2.20.33; X 2.22.10; and similar author-
ities. Witnesses about these two types of articles are properly ad-
206. That the basic motivation for the rule in canon law was fear of subordination 
of perjury is clear. See authority cited in note 220 infra and accompanying text. The 
Roman law rule, however, may have been prompted more by a desire to expedite the 
proceedings. See CODE 7 .62.4; NOVELS 90.4. 
207. On the two fora, see 5 DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT CANONI~UE For 871, 872-73 (1953). 
Because of the potential conflict between the two fora, there was even some doubt in 
this period as to whether a judgment in a marriage case could ever become res judicata. 
See X 2.2.7.7 and accompanying rubric and glosses; L. MUSSELL!, IL CoNCETIO DI GIUDI-
CATO NELLE FoNTI STORICHE DEL DIRITTO CANONICO §§ 7, 15, 19 (Pubblicazioni della 
Universita di Pavia, Studi Nelle Scienze Giuridiche e Sociali No. 7 (n.s.), 1972). Granted 
this doubt, one could see why some commentators would have thought that the general 
rule barring the introduction of new articles after the testimony had been published 
did not apply to marriage cases. See text accompanying note 214 infra. 
208. Translation by the author. The text of the original is found in Appendix B 
infra. The translation is from the item beginning "Quarta excepcio," beginning at 
"quod autem dicitur" to "licet presens sit in corpore." The citation system has been 
modernized in the translation, and I have chosen some renderings that convey the 
brief-like style of the passage at the expense of literal accuracy. 
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mitted after the testimony has been published about the first articles, 
as the gloss on novis of X 2.20.17 notes. This is the case which we 
have at hand. Alice's defense of violence supposes that the form of 
the contract was present but that the substance, consent, was absent 
(for consent has no place where force intervenes (X 4.1.14)). There-
'fore, there is no reason why absence of consent or mind, like absence 
of body, cannot be proven after the testimony has been published. 
For just as it is possible to contract marriage by present consent 
even though you are not present in body, as -J.or example by mes-
senger or letter, so it is possible for there to be no contract between 
present parties if consent is absent. Just as a madman is said to be 
absent in mind even though he is present in body (Digest 50.17.40), 
so one who is coerced is said to be absent in that mind that is re-
quired for matrimony, even though he is present in body. 
If we tum to the texts of the Decretals (the Sext and Clementines 
having not yet appeared), we ·will not find anything that directly 
answers the question that Alice's counsel was posing: Is a defense 
(exception) of force barred after publication of testimony concerning 
the contract? Nor do we find any text that makes the fourfold dis-
tinction that he suggests is dispositive. Rather, we find a number of 
cases that state the general rule, either by way of dictum or holding, 
that, once testimony about a matter has been published, further testi-
mony about that matter is barred, and we find a few cases that ex-
pressly or by implication go the other way.200 if we examine the 
rubrics of Raymond of Peiiafort, the compiler of the Decretals, we 
get the impression that the general rule is well-nigh inviolable. The 
only exception that he notes with approval is that where testimony 
has been received in a summary proceeding the same articles may be 
tried again in a full proceeding using the same or different wit-
nesses. 210 
What Alice's counsel has done, then, is to create a coherent pat• 
tern where no coherent pattern is directly suggested in the texts. To 
do this he employs cases that Raymond placed in the Decretals to il-
lustrate quite different rules. He is helped to his result by the glosses, 
although none of them makes his point quite so precisely as he 
does: 211 
209. See text accompanying notes 211-28 infra. 
210. X 2.20.38. 
211. We need not, of course, assume that the pattern is original with Alice's 
counsel. It has all the hallmarks of academic commentary of the period, and it may 
have been something that he learned in the University. I know of no contemporary 
commentary, however, that approaches this particular problem in quite the way that 
he does. Durandus suggests a fourfold division in his treatment of the same problem. 
G. DuRANDUS, SPECULUM CUllt ADDITIONIBUS lib. 1, pt. 4, tit. de attestationum publi· 
catione, § 7 (1508). The division, however, is not the same as that employed by Alice's 
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(I) "There are four types of articles that should be considered 
with regard to the present matter." None of the texts or glosses says 
this, and to reach this statement, Alice's counsel has had to ignore, as 
not pertinent to "the present matter," the one distinction that the 
rubrics mak.e,212 that between articles introduced in the same pro-
ceeding and articles introduced in a different type of proceeding. 
(2) "[A]bout neither of these can there be a production of wit-
nesses after the testimony about the first article has been published. 
X 2.20.38; X 2.19.6 ... " Here Alice's counsel partially concedes his 
opponent's argument, but in a way that suggests that he need not go 
even this far. X 2.20.38 deals with the introduction of the same ar-
ticle, but it is the decretal that holds that such an article may be 
introduced in a plenary proceeding even though the same article has 
been introduced in a prior summary proceeding. The citation seems 
to imply the argument that even where the same article is introduced, 
the rule is not so absolute as the plaintiff maintains. X 2.19.6 deals 
with an article directly to the contrary and also with a marriage case. 
The headnotes213 state that the general rule applies even in marriage 
cases, but the glosses note that there is another decretal (X 2.20.35) 
that seems to go the other way.214 Some commentators suggest, the 
gloss continues, that the distinction to be drawn between these two 
decretals lies in the fact that X 2.19.6 deals with a contract of mar-
riage, while X 2.20.35 deals with a present marriage.215 The gloss 
ultimately rejects this distinction and suggests that only "different 
articles or those pendent on the prior article"216 should be admitted; 
but once again Alice's counsel seems to be suggesting that he may 
counsel, although there is some similarity in the language and in the decretals cited. 
Cf. HoSTIENsIS, Su~u,rA AUREA lib. 2 (de testibus), c. 11 (Venice 1581). · · 
212. X 2.20.38, rubric. 
213. The marginal commentary on the Decretals is generally divided into two parts: 
the casus, a brief statement of the facts and holdings of a decretal much like a modern 
headnote, and the glosses, a set of elaborate footnotes keyed to specific words in the text. 
The final rescension of these latter, made by Bernardus Parmensis (died 1266), had 
already become the "ordinary gloss" (glossa ordinaria). Bernardus also wrote a set of 
casus that are found in some but by no means all manuscripts of the Decretals. We can 
be reasonably sure that Alice's counsel had the glossa ordinaria before him; we can be 
considerably less sure that he had Bernardus', or anyone else's, casus before him. See 
notes 14, 189 supra; 2 J. VON SCHULTE, GESCHICHTE DER QUELLEN, UND LITERATUR DES 
KANONISCHEN RECHTS VON GRATIAN BIS AUF DIE GEGENWART 115-16 (1875). 
214. X 2.19.6, gloss on partibus. 
215. See note 207 supra. A contract of marriage, of course, created a merely con-
tractual obligation, while a present marriage was a sacrament, indissoluble even by 
the parties and subject to the Biblical injunction, "What God has joined, let not man 
put asunder.'' Matthew 19:6. See generally G. JoYCE, CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE (2d ed. 1948). 
216. "super alio articulo et super novo pendente C.".: priori.'' X 2.19.6, gloss on 
partibus. 
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have conceded too much, because one decretal and some commen-
tators suggest that the general rule does not apply to cases of present 
marriage at all. 
(3) "There are also articles completely diverse from the first but 
not contrary to it, and there is a fourth type of article that depends on 
the first ... but does not completely destroy it. X 2.20.33; X 2.22.10 
.... " Here the symmetry breaks down. The statement of law is clearly 
derived from the gloss on X 2.19.6, but neither X 2.20.33 nor X 2.22.10 
is precisely on point. X 2.20.33 is a case in which the pope, on appeal, 
disqualified some witnesses but nonetheless remanded the case for 
the taking of new testimony on the same article. The citation is in-
teresting, however, because of the amount of effort Alice's counsel 
had to put in to see how it was relevant to his case at all. Neither the 
rubric, nor the headnotes, nor the glosses suggest that the case is 
contrary to the general rule. The focus of all three is on what the 
decretal has to say about the qualifications of witnesses. Alice's coun-
sel, however, saw that the holding of the decretal necessarily involved 
an exception to the general rule, an exception perhaps broad enough 
to support the proposition that the rule will not be applied where it 
works manifest injustice. X 2.22.10 is closer to supporting the point 
for which it is cited. In X 2.22.10 the plaintiff, after the defendant's 
testimony had been published, introduced evidence to the effect that 
a contract, which the plaintiff had proved, was conditional, and the 
pope sustained the claim. Raymond put the case in the Decretals 
because it supports the proposition that three witnesses prevail over 
a ·written instrument.217 The headnotes suggest that the case stands 
for the proposition that a new article may be introduced after the 
testimony has been published,218 but the arguments of counsel re-
ported in the case suggest that a completely new article could not 
have been introduced because the case was on appeal. Rather, the 
article that suggested that the contract was conditional "depended 
on the old [article]."219 Thus, the case supports Alice's counsel's 
proposition that dependent but not contrary articles may be intro" 
duced after publication. 
(4) "Witnesses about these two types of articles are properly ad-
mitted after the testimony has been published ... gloss on novis of 
X 2.20.17 .... " X 2.20.17 is the only decretal cited by Alice's coun-
sel that is not a decision in a specific case. Rather, it is the pope's 
response to a hypothetical question posed by a bishop: Can new wit-
217. X 2.22.10, rubric. 
218, Id., casus: "super novo articulo puplicatis attestationibus testes recipiuntur." 
219. Id., text: "etsi novum esset capitulum, pendebat tamen ex veteri." 
March 1974] Stubbs vs. Maitland 691 
nesses be introduced after the parties have renounced further pro-
duction of witnesses? The pope's answer states the general rule but 
adds that in appeal cases witnesses either old or new may be intro-
duced about a new article. The gloss, citing X 2.22.10,220 defines new 
as dependent upon or arising from the old. This is most helpful for 
Alice's counsel because it suggests that both new and dependent ar-
ticles are included within the exception stated in the text of X 2.20.17. 
But what of the fact that both X 2.22.10 and X 2.20.17 seem to deal 
only with articles introduced on appeal? Here again the gloss comes 
to the rescue. The Roman law comm~ntators, it says, attempt to rec-
oncile the divergent texts of Roman law concerning the introduction 
of new articles on the basis of whether the new articles are introduced 
at first instance or on appeal. But the reason for the general rule, the 
gloss continues, is the danger of subornation of perjury, and this dan-
ger is just as great whether the case is on appeal or still before the 
judge of first instance. The true distinction, the gloss concludes, is 
based on the nature of the article: Those that are new but depend on 
the old may be admitted either at first instance or on appeal.221 
(5) The other two citations are of less interest. "[C]onsent has no 
place where force intervenes" is a direct quotation from X 4.1.14, 
where it is used in quite another context.222 The invalidity, however, 
of matrimonial consent obtained by force was well established.223 
That a madman is present in body but absent in mind is not found 
in Digest 50.17.40 but in the Accursian gloss on this passage.224 The 
statement, however, was commonplace.225 
Despite the paucity of citation and the pedestrian nature of those 
220. X 2.20.17, gloss on novis. 
221. Sed domini legum satis frivolam adhibent solutionem. Intelligunt eum 
authenticum [NOVELS 90.4] in eadem causa ante sententiam diffinitivam, leges 
istas [CODE 7.62.41 in causa appellationis. Sed ratio prohibitionis remanet in 
eadem causa appeflationis que fuit in principali, scilicet, periculum subornationis, 
et ideo quod causa remanet eadem utrobique eadem debet esse prohibitio 
utrobique, et ubi est eadem ratio idem iudicium habendum est. • • • Unde 
dicendum est quod apertis attestationibus ulterius non recipiantur super eisdem 
articulis alii testes, et leges predicte recte possunt intelligi ut habeant locum 
super novis articulis pendentibus ex prioribus, et sic concordabunt iuri 
canonico •••• 
X 2.20.17, gloss on novis. 
222. X 4.1,14, text: "[L]ocum non habeat consensus ubi metus vel coactio inter-
cedit." The case contains instructions to judges to provide a safe place for women 
pending the trial of cases where force seems to be at stake. 
223. See, e.g., TANCREDUS, SUMMA DE MARTIMONIO tit. 25, at 44 (A. Wunderlich 
ed. 1841): "[Vis] ex sui natura sive constitutione ecclesiae matrimonialem consensum 
ex:clusit." 
224. Accunsu GLossA IN D1c:rsruM 591 (Corpus Glossatorum Juris Civilis No. 9, 
1968). 
225. See, e.g., DIGllST 29.7.2.3. 
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authorities that are cited, these concluding sentences of the argument 
are critical. The argument so far has established that affirmative 
defenses, defenses that assume the truth of the first article but go on 
to deny its effect by adding something to it, are admissible. Alice's 
counsel must now show that her defense-that she was forced to con-
sent to the marriage-is that kind of defense. Today we might phrase 
his argument this way: Once the plaintiff has sustained his burden of 
going fon'lard and the defendant has put in his evidence denying the 
elements in the plaintiff's case, then, after this testimony is in, the 
defendant should have an opportunity to demonstrate those things 
about which he has the burden .. Alice's counsel does not make this 
argument, however, because his authorities do not speak in terms of 
burdens of going fon\Tard. In fact, if we leave out the general state-
ments in the glosses, his authorities are quite thin. The only case 
squarely on point is X 2.22.10, the conditional contract case, and 
even that one could be distinguished on the ground that in that case 
the second article was offered on appeal. 
Faced with this problem, Alice's counsel plays an old lawyer's 
trick. He assumes that a much more extreme case would be decided 
in his favor, and then argues that his easier case should be decided 
the same way: The defense of force, he says, supposes the form of 
the contract but denies the substance. (True, but whoever said that 
all that John had proved was the form of the contract?) Absence of 
body, he continues, may be proved after the publication (who said 
so?), because it is possible to have a valid contract even though one 
of the contracting parties is not there. (If all that the first article 
showed was that there was a contract in form, then it might be argued 
that articles concerning absence could be introduced, because proof 
of a contract in form would not necessarily exclude the possibility of 
one of the parties being absent. But this again assumes that all that 
the first article alleged was that there was a contract in form. There 
is also a more fundamental problem: Proof of physical absence alone 
isn't going to do the defendant any good, since the law allowed an 
absent man to contract marriage by sending a messenger or a letter.220 
He is going to have to show not only that he was absent, but also that 
he didn't authorize a messenger or send a letter. But if the defendant 
attempts to show that neither he nor his authorized messenger nor 
his letter was involved, he comes perilously close to contradicting 
directly the form of contract assumed to be shown by the testimony 
about the first article.) Just as one can contract validly and be absent 
226. See l A. ESMEIN, LE MARIAGE EN DROIT CANONIQUE 189-91 (R. Genestal rev. ed. 
1929) and sources cited therein. 
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in body, Alice's counsel continues, so one can be present in body 
and absent in mind and thus not contract validly. This is the situation 
of a madman or one who is coerced, both of whom are· present in 
body but absent in mind. (The fundamental problem is avoided by a 
neat tum of phrase. Of course one can be present in body and still 
not validly contract, and one does not have to be a madman or 
coerced in order to do so: One simply has not to agree to a bargain. 
The question is not one of the substantive law of contract, however 
much Alice's counsel would like to make us think it is; the question 
is whether John's proof of contract directly or by implication in-
cluded proof of freely given consent, so that introduction of proof of 
absence of consent would constitute a direct denial of the prior 
proof.) 
How is it that our thirteenth-century lawyer who seemed capable 
in the previous sentences of quite sophisticated argumentation sud-
denly drops into a line of argument that would make a first-year law 
student blush? It is possible that he was incapable of sustaining 
the effort of the previous sentences. There is nothing in the rest of 
his brief that would give us much reason to trust in his abilities.227 
It is possible, too, that John's articles did not allege that the consent 
was freely given or that they simply alleged a formally valid contract 
and that Alice's counsel is therefore arguing, without so saying, that 
only what the articles allege and not what the witnesses actually said 
is to be used in determining whether a new article involves a direct 
contradiction. It may also be that our Ia-wyer thought that his cause 
was hopeless and that he could think of nothing better than the tum 
of phrase, "absent in body and absent in mind," to conceal its weak-
ness. A still further possibility is that he thought that the tum of 
phrase solved his problem. Those who have read much in either 
medieval law or medieval philosophy know that the medieval mind 
put much more stock in purely verbal analysis and distinctions than 
we do. 
We can rescue our lawyer, however, if we assume that it was so 
firmly established as not to require citation of authority that the defen-
dant in a marriage case could introduce articles to prove his physical 
absence from the scene of the alleged marriage after the plaintiff's 
testimony was published and without regard to what the plaintiff's 
227. See, e.g., the argument that he makes about proof of negative facts and 
words, in Appendix. B infra. Here he seems to want to equate the t1110 proofs except 
for the fact that proof of negative words must be accompanied by proof of circum-
stances. He seems to have confused totally the difference between the proof of the 
absence of something (which the canonists regarded as virtually impossible) and the 
proof that someone had made a negative statement. 
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articles or his witnesses said. Now, there is some support for this 
proposition in the decretal X 2.20.35, which Alice's counsel cites 
at least by implication because it is discussed in the gloss to X 2.19.6. 
Indeed, some quite respected commentators thought that X 2.20.35 
meant just this: Exceptions of absence in marriage cases might be 
introduced at any time.228 But the writer of the gloss on X 2.19.6 and 
Raymond's rubrics on X 2.20.35 both suggested that X 2.20.35 was 
aberrant. If Alice's counsel had introduced that decretal for the 
proposition for which he wanted to use it, he would have undercut 
the authority of a gloss on which he was relying heavily for his basic 
distinctions among types of articles and would have called attention 
to Raymond's questioning rubric. So Alice's counsel did not cite X 
2.20.35; instead, he wrote his brief as if he assumed that the proposi-
tion he would have used it for was so obvious as not to need citation. 
All this makes the argument seem a bit more clever, but it is still 
a basically bad argument unless we go one step further and assume 
that the judge to whom the argument was addressed would also have 
assumed, without necessity for citation, that exceptions of absence 
could be introduced at any time. There is some evidence that he 
might have. The York court regularly229 allows the introduction of 
many kinds of exceptions after the testimony has been published-a 
striking divergence from the Church's common law. One of the more 
frequently allowed of these exceptions is the exception of absence 
in marriage cases.230 Of course, a peculiarity of York in the fourteenth 
century is not necessarily a peculiarity of Canterbury in the thir-
teenth. But if thirteenth-century Canterbury followed the same 
practice as fourteenth-century York, Alice's counsel's argument takes 
on considerably more weight: Alice's counsel has just shown that the 
only kinds of articles that the authorities allow to be introduced after 
the testimony is published are articles that contradict the first article 
only indirectly. Now, the only way to justify the regular allowance 
of exceptions of physical absence under this rule is to say that, what-
ever the first article alleging a marriage contract says and whatever 
the witnesses say, all that has been alleged and proved so far as the 
rule about new articles is concerned is that there was a contract in 
form. Since it is possible to have a contract in form without one of 
the contracting parties being physically present, an article that al-
228. See text accompanying notes 214-16 supra. 
229. See cases cited in note 230 infra. Cf. Alice, daughter of John Cressy c. William 
Whitened, CP.E. 97 (1368) (court allows plaintiff to introduce articles on appeal that 
completely change her testimony in the lower court). 
230. See, e.g., Alice Malmon c. John Belamy, CP.E. 131 (1373); Marjory Spuret c. 
Thomas Hornby, CP.E. 205-07, 209 (1393). 
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leges that the party was not present and did not authorize such a 
contract is not directly contrary to the first article for purposes of the 
rule. If the rule has been stretched this far in the case of exceptions 
of physical absence, surely it is not stretching it any further to admit 
exceptions of mental absence. Indeed, allowing such exceptions 
would not go so far, because an exception of coercion or insanity ·will 
normally involve less direct contradiction of what the first article and 
·witnesses have actually said and hence will involve less danger of 
subornation of perjury in violation of the policy of the general rule. 
One legal argument from one case is not much on which to base 
conclusions about how papal law books were used in medieval En-
gland. Even when we add the rest of the arguments in Elham c. Dover 
and the arguments in Picheford c. Neville, we haven't got much to go 
on. But so few of these arguments have come to light that they 
should be considered as carefully as possible, and some preliminary 
conclusions should be drmvn. 
Since neither of the modern terms "case book" or "statute book" 
describes the papal law books, we should not expect to find that the 
papal law books are being used in a way that fits our ideas of how 
either type of authority should be used. It is not clear that even today 
we could define precisely how each type of authority is to be used. 
As a general matter, however, we might be able to obtain a consensus 
that the holding of a case is binding (unless overruled) in situations 
that have the same legally relevant facts; that the ratio decidendi 
(when defined as the reason given by the judge for his decision) may, 
· but need not, be binding in cases ·with different facts; and that dicta 
are not binding at all, except insofar as the judge in the subsequent 
case independently finds them persuasive. Statutes, on the other 
hand, are absolutely binding on a judge in cases to which their 
language clearly applies; their rationale may be sought only in situa-
tions where their applicability, as determined from their language, is 
doubtful; and by and large they may not be used at all in situations 
that their language does not, at least arguably, cover.231 Even when 
the distinctions are thus simplified (and distorted), Robert's and 
Alice's counsels' arguments, like those of the academic canon lawyers, 
clearly cannot be fitted into either mold. 
We can find uses of authority in these arguments that seem to par-
231. These generalizations, of course, apply only to Anglo-American law. Even 
as so confined they raise numerous questions. See generally C. AUERBACH, L. GARRISON, 
w. HURST &: s. :MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS 43-65, 424-54, 490-501, 504-18 (1961), and 
materials cited therein; A.R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw (1968); F. FRANKFURTER, 
SOME REFLECrIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES (1947); J. MONTROSE, PRECEDENT IN 
ENGLISH LAw AND OTHER ESSAYS (1968). 
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take more of the statutory approach. For example, in Robert's ra-
ciones232 the principle that the Prior of Bradley had no authority to 
execute his sentence is supported by citation to a decretal233 the 
dispositive part of which states that, in an advowson case that the 
pope has delegated for trial, the winner should be presented by the 
judge delegate to the bishop, and the bishop, not the judge, should 
institute him to the benefice he has won. Viewed as an Anglo-Ameri-
can common law case, the decretal is quite distinguishable from 
Robert's situation because in the decretal it was the bishop and not 
the defeated party who was -complaining, and the rationale of the 
decision is that the delegation of the case should not be presumed to 
defeat episcopal rights, something, not involved in the Picheford case, 
since the bishop had instituted Thomas Neville. Thus, Robert's coun-
sel is here using a case as if it were a statute. 
On the other hand, Alice's counsel uses X 2.20.33 in a way in 
which a statute could not be used~ The dispositive part of this decretal 
states simply that the case is to be remanded for the taking of new 
testimony on the question of whether the defendant was disqualified 
to hold ecclesiastical office. The witnesses, the pope notes, may in-
clude suitable laymen or women. The case is collected for the proposi-
tion that laymen and women may testify about impediments to 
holding ecclesiastical offices. It is only if one reads the entire case that 
one realizes that the holding, although not the language of the case, 
also supports the proposition for which Alice's counsel used it: that in 
certain circumstances new testimony can be taken even after the 
testimony of other witnesses on the same issue has been published.234 
Sometimes the citations show a search for the underlying rationale 
of a decretal in a way that is quite different from the way either 
cases or statutes are used in Anglo-American jurisdictions. For ex-
ample, Robert's counsel, having established the general proposition 
that nothing should be innovated pending appeal, wishes to demon-
strate that, pending appeal, the possession of a benefice should not be 
disturbed. He cites for this proposition a decretal230 that does not 
concern pending appeals at all, but, rather, holds that one who asks 
the pope to provide him to a benefice must mention that the benefice 
is possessed by another even if the possession is de facto only and not 
de jure. The rationale of this decretal, Robert's counsel seems to be 
telling us, is the same as the one he is seeking to have applied to this 
232. See text accompanying notes 192-94 supra. 
233. X 1.29.15. 
234. See text between notes 216-17 supra. 
235. X 3.8.6. 
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case: Possession of a benefice should not be disturbed unless and until 
there is a final judicial determination of the -underlying right. 
· In fact, as Alice's counsel's argument indicates,236 the way in 
which these authorities were used can only be described as eclectic. 
We can, and the commentators will give us some support in this,237 
arrange the authorities he uses into a hierarchy. First come papal 
pronouncements, of whatever type, the more recent taking precedence 
over the more ancient; next, decrees of local councils, those from the 
area in which the court is sitting taking precedence over those in 
other areas; next, in a somewhat shadowy status, Roman law; and 
finally, academic commentary. We can also, if we choose, classify 
authorities by types: decrees of general and local councils being most 
like statutes, papal decrees being almost the same, decisions by the 
popes in actual litigated cases being most like Anglo-American cases, 
and papal answers to questions-real or hypothetical-falling some-
place in between. The arguments, however, give us no indication that 
such distinctions made any difference. It is all law; it is all authorita-
tive; and it is all to be manipulated by whatever means come to hand, 
always, if our reading of Alice's argument is correct, with a keen 
awareness of the custom of the court to which the argument is ad-
dressed.238 
Of ~ourse, in a case of direct conflict the hierarchy suggested 
above might dictate which rule would apply, although there would be 
some doubt as to where custom would fit on the scale. But direct 
conflicts are rare, particularly since the academic method of the . 
236. See text accompanying notes 204-30 supra. 
237. See Kuttner, supra note 184, at 309-10, for the suggestion that the hierarchy, if 
it was used at all, was used only for the purpose of determining whether an authority 
should be admitted to the common law of the church. Once admitted, conflicting 
authorities were reconciled by other means. See also G. LE BRAS, C. LEFEBVRE & J. 
RAMBAUD, supra note 187, at 396-405. 
238. Of course, Alice's counsel's arg!fment is not the only evidence that we have 
of the importance of the custom of the court. See text accompanying notes 129-43, 
152-68 supra for discussion of the custom of the York court with regard to tuitorlal 
appeal and the use of custom as a supplement to papal substantive law. On the 
other hand, I am not suggesting that either the manipulation of the contents of the 
law books or the reliance on custom was peculiar to the English ecclesiastical courts. 
A glance at the surviving fourteenth-century judgments of the Roman Rota indicates 
that more careful analysis would show that the auditors of the Rota manipulated the 
law in the same way that Robert's and Alice's counsel did. See, e.g., BERNARDUS DE 
BISIGNETO, DECISIONES, tit. de testibus, decisio 1 (before 1365), in ROTAE AUDITORUM 
DECISIONES NOVAE, ANTIQUAE ET ANTIQUIORES (Venice ed. 1570) (contains two citations 
to the Digest, one to the Decretals, and one to a gloss on the Decretals). Certainly 
they did so in later periods. See generally J. NooN,AN, POWER ro DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND 
MARRIAGES IN THE COURTS OF THE ROMAN CURIA (1972). Tancred's famous early 
thirteenth-century tract on procedure, Ordo Judiciarius, shows the same keen aware-
ness of the importance of the custom of the church court of Bologna, with which 
he was intimately familiar. E.g., TANCREDus, supra note 175, at 279-80. 
698 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:647 
lawyers of this tradition greatly preferred reconciling conflicting 
authorities to selecting which of two conflicting authorities was of 
more weight.239 Of course, the way in which the authorities were 
manipulated depended on their nature. Thus, a seeming conflict 
between two actual cases could be reconciled on the basis of the 
facts.240 On the other hand, where the decretal was an abstract answer 
to an abstract hypothetical question, the manipulation had to be 
1 verbal. For example, when the pope, in an answer to a hypothetical 
question, referred to "new articles in appeal cases," he meant articles 
that depended on the old articles but did not contradict them.241 
Further, in the light of previous authority, including Roman law, 
the rule announced need not be confined to appeal cases but could 
be applied to "new" articles at any stage of the proceedings.242 
In conclusion, then, the distinction between statutes and cases 
will not take us very far. It will take us this far, however: If Maitland 
meant to imply by "absolutely binding statute law" that the English 
ecclesiastical courts rigidly adhered to the letter of what was con-
tained in the papal law books, and if what Stubbs and Kemp meant 
by their reference to case law was that there was quite a bit of room 
for interpretation of what was in the papal law books, then Stubbs 
and Kemp have the better of the argument, at least so far as we can 
tell from the evidence now before us. 
The effect of this malleable quality of papal law on the attitude 
of the judges of the ecclesiastical courts toward the binding quality 
of that law must, because of the sparseness of the evidence examined 
to date, remain problematical. That the judges would, at least at 
times, manipulate the law in arriving at their judgments may fairly 
be inferred from the briefs we have examined; othenvise, it would 
have been foolish to write them. We have no direct evidence, how-
ever, that the judges thought that they were manipulating the law in 
order to arrive at their own body of law, different from if not com-
pletely at odds with papal law, and we may simply be witnessing 
an instance of the general phenomenon that no body of law, and 
certainly not medieval canon law, can be applied to the limitless 
variety of human situations that come before the courts without con-
siderable manipulation. There may, however, be some indirect evi-
239. See generally s. KUTINER, HARMONY FROM DISSONANCE: AN INTERPRETATION OF 
MEDIEVAL CANON LAW (1960). 
240. E.g., the resolution of the seeming conflict between X 2.20.35 and X 2,19,6 
by some commentators on the basis of the fact that the former case involved a contract 
to marry, the latter an actual marriage. See text accompanying notes 213-16 suJ,ra, 
241. See text accompanying note 220 supra. 
242. Id. 
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dence of judicial attitude to the law that can be derived from the 
nature of the English courts Christian as an institution. We will 
address this question as we attempt to draw some tentative conclu-
sions. 
IV. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
The Stubbs-Maitland debate and the ensuing scholarship sug-
gest that the binding quality of papal law in England may be viewed 
in the light of three sets of variables: (1) the institutions in question, 
(2) the time in question, and (3) the type of case involved:243 
(1) Stubbs, as Maitland points out,244 is guilty of failing to dis-
tinguish carefully between the position of the kings vis-a-vis the pope 
and that of the English church vis-a-vis the pope. Stubbs assumed that 
the position of the king and what he was able to enforce were the 
same thing as the position of the English church and what it con-
sented to. The records of the church courts provide us little direct 
information about the king-pope relationship, but they do tell us 
something about the king-English church and English church-pope 
relationships.245 
So far as the relationship between the king and the English church 
243. There is one more variable of obvious significance: the similarities or dif-
ferences between the binding quality of papal law in England and on the continent. 
Stubbs' arguments would suggest that papal law was less binding in England than 
on the continent, Maitland's that it was at least as binding, if not more so. In 
order to get some feel for the question, it would be necessary to look at the surviving 
records of the continental ecclesiastical courts in somewhat the same way that I 
have looked at the English records and then draw the comparison. I have not done 
so in this paper both because of limits of time and space and because of my un-
familiarity with the continental records. What little work I have been able to do 
would indicate that the differences were ones of detail but not of over-all effect. 
For example, in France the church was apparently more successful than in England 
in obtaining jurisdiction over the crimes of clerks as a matter of first instance, but 
less successful in seeing to it that the criminous clerk was not subject to secular 
punishment after the church courts were through with him. Compare L. GABEL, 
BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE I.ATER MIDDLE AGES (Smith College Studies in 
History No. 14, 1929); Cheney, The Punishment of Felonious Clerks, 51 ENGLISH HIS-
TORICAL REv. 215 (1936); and Maitland, Henry II and the Criminous Clerks, 'l ENGLISH 
HISTORICAL REv. 224 (1892), reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 132, with 
P. FOURNIER, supra note 87, at 64-77, 94-127; R. GENESTAL, LE PRIVILEGIUM Foru IN 
FRANCE (1922); and o. MARTIN, L'AssEMBLEE DE VINCENNES DE 1329 ET SES CONSEQUENCES 
(1909). 
The full comparative study remains to be done, however, and France, because of 
its fine archival tradition, strikes me as a good place to start. See also R. BRENTANO, 
Two CHURCHES: ENGLAND AND ITALY IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY (1968). 
244. Maitland, supra note 28, at 641-42, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, 
at 51-53. 
245. Recent research would add yet a fourth force, that of the lay magnates. 
See, e.g., W. PANTIN, supra note 29, at 82-84. For our purposes, however, we can 
regard the lay magnates as being part of the king's side, since at least the York records 
show little evidence that the lay magnates, independent of the king, exercised pressure 
on the court. 
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is concerned, the evidence indicates that the church courts were quite 
independent of the king's law, but this independence should not be 
exaggerated. The church courts depended on the king to bring physi-
cal force to bear in support of their jurisdiction and sanctions;240 
they were subject to having cases being heard before them prohibited; 
and they aided the king's courts by making rulings about matters 
peculiarly within their own competence.247 Further, there is con-
siderable evidence that litigants did not regard the choice of one 
forum as precluding choice of the other but pursued remedies in two 
or more fora serially or even concurrently as it suited their pur-
poses.24s 
· On the other hand, the king's law definitely was not the church's 
law. The citations of authorities from Canterbury and the decided 
cases from York show us clearly that the "Roman canon law" sup-
plemented by local ecclesiastical statute and custom were the author-
ities to which the church courts turned to decide cases. There are 
only t:11ro documents in the entire collection that even suggest an 
influence of the king's law on the law the church courts were apply-
ing.249 The blanket rejection of the attempt by counsel in Flemyng 
246. See generally F. LoGAN, supra note 138. 
247. See, e.g., Katherine, widow of John Hiliard c. Peter, son of the same, CP.E. 
108-09 (1370), where the king's court asks the York court to determine a marriage 
question in connection with a dower action brought before the king's court. 
248. E.g., in Thomas Kendall c. Henry, Rector of Foston, CP .E, 193 (1391), Thomas 
and his wife, executors of the will of one Peter Wolffe, aileged that Henry had goods 
of their deceased in his possession. They sued out a writ of trespass d.b.a. against 
Henry in the king's court and concurrently sued him for impeding the execution of 
the will in the York court. In William Chese c. Katherine, widow of Henry Axiholm, 
CP.E. 217, 218-20 (1395) (see note 97 supra) the parties pursued the matter, at various 
times, before the York court, the king's court, the court of the mayor and bailiffs of 
York, and specially chosen arbitrators. 
249. In Robert Applegarth, Late Rector of Ail Saints' Northgate c. Executors of Sir 
Robert Hannsard, Kt., CP .E. 192 (1391), we find an extraordinary run of terms that 
must reflect, although somewhat confusedly, common law influence. The case con-
cerns the Rector's ciaim to be entitled to one fourth of the candles and candelabra 
(or their value) used at Hannsard's funeral, even though the funeral had not taken 
place at Ail Saints', because Hannsard was a parishioner of All Saints'. The interest-
ing thing, for our purposes, is what the Rector aIIeges that the executors did with the 
candles: They took them (ceperunt) from the church in which the funeral took place, 
asported (asportaverunt) them, and converted them to their own use (converterunt acl 
usum suum). The taking and asportation claims are the standard ones in the writ of 
trespass de bonis asportatis. See, e.g., EARLY REc1sr£RS OF WRITS, mpra note 64, at 175 
(no. 285). Conversion, however, was not a separate tort at common law until the six-
teenth century, but the phrase "converted to his own use" does appear in common 
law sources of this time, frequently to describe the wrongful action of an executor. 
See s. Mn.sOM, HISI'ORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 322-23 (1969). See also 
id. at 321-32. To my knowledge, none of these phrases is used in the academic 
romano-canon law. 
In the libel in John Stanton, as curator of William, son of Geoffrey Smith c. 
Nicholas, son of Hugh Young, CP.E. 24lr (1358), we find the phrase "devcnerunt ad 
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c. St. Alban's to plead the king's law as local custom250 and the total 
absence of any argument based on the king's law about church court 
jurisdiction characterize the attitude of the court to the king's law. 
We should not, however, get the impression that because the 
church courts were independent of the king, the relations between 
the two were necessarily strained, despite the seemingly irreconcilable 
statements of jurisdictional principle that we find in the gravamina, 
on the one hand, and in the prohibition ·writs and such statutory doc-
uments as Articuli Cleri, on the other. The considerable areas of 
cooperation indicate quite the contrary. Even the operations of the 
prohibition system, at least as viewed from the York court, inay be 
seen as the product of a working, probably tacit, compromise.251 On 
its side the York court seems to have obeyed those prohibitions that 
it received; on his side the king permitted those litigants who chose 
to undertake the trouble and expense of a trip to Westminster to 
remove certain types of cases to his courts, but did not seek to pro-
hibit cases on his mvn motion. The result was that many cases that 
could have been prohibited were heard by the York court. 
The relationship between the English church courts and the pope 
operated on both an' institutional and a legal plane. On the institu-
tional plane the Court of Rome took many, but not all, important 
cases to itself, but the English courts exercised an important :filtering 
function through the grant or denial of tuition. On the legal plane, 
the courts applied, and felt themselves bound by, the papal law books, 
but supplemented these books in a number of sigificant areas by local 
statute and custom. Further, the papal law was subject to considerable 
manipulation in its application to specific cases. The relationship 
might be characterized as one of great deference but not of blind 
adherence. 
manus" used to describe the wrongful detention of chattel that had been bequeathed 
to the pla~ntiff. I know of no use of this phrase in academic romano-canon law; on 
the other hand, it played a considerable part in the development of the writ of detinue. 
See S. MILSOIII, supra, at 233-34. 
Another possible influence of the common law is the idea of "legal memory" (see 
1 F. POLLOCK &: F. :MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 168) found in the pleadings in imme-
morial custom cases. See, e.g., text accompanying note 169 supra. But the presence of 
these ideas in both canon and common law may reflect a common Roman antecedent. 
See generally R. WHERLE, supra note 171. 
250. See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra. 
251. One bit of evidence supporting the hypothesis that such a compromise was 
made is the fact that, to my knowledge, the king made no attempt to limit the church 
courts' jurisdiction on his own motion, after the unsuccessful attempt to do so in 
Norfolk in 1286. The king's abandonment of this Norfolk effort is the immediate 
cause of the document known as Circumspecte Agatis. See note 107 supra and author-
ities cited therein. 
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In s~mmary, royal interference was not such that papal law can, 
as a practical matter, be said not to be binding because the king pre-
vents it from so being. On the other hand, the nature of the church 
courts as institutions, the sources of the law applied in them, and the 
way in which they applied the papal law considerably reduced the 
importance, if they did not change the binding quality, of papal law. 
(2) Both Stubbs and Maitland speak at times as if the period 
from Becket to Henry VIII were all of a piece. We know, however, 
that the political influence of the papacy in England changed con-
siderably over this period.252 Do the church court records provide 
any evidence that these changes were accompanied by corresponding 
changes in the binding quality of papal law? 
The records show some changes in the fourteenth century that 
may reflect the decline of papal power associated with the Avignon 
papacy. Writing of the period 1198-1254, Jane Sayers states that all 
ecclesiastical cases of any importance went to Rome, and that those 
that were not heard there were heard by judges in England specially 
delegated for the purpose.253 Our examination of the York records 
has shown that this is not true for York in the fourteenth century. 
In theory, of course, the pope remains universal ordinary, and any 
case may be brought to him at any stage of the proceeding. In practice, 
however, the universal ordinary is not universal to quite the same 
extent in the fourteenth century that he was in the thirteenth. Cases 
still come to him, but not all important cases, and judges delegate 
are not nearly so much in evidence, their place having been taken, at 
least in part, by the local ecclesiastical courts. Significantly, of the 
six delegations mentioned in the York records, two are to the Arch-
bishop of York and one is to his Official.254 All three cases are heard 
in the regular channels of the York court. These changes do not 
necessarily imply a change in the binding power of papal law, but 
they do show that the local ecclesiastical courts are becoming institu-
tionally more independent of the pope. 
The relationship between the king and the church courts, as 
viewed at least from York, does not seem to change much until the 
end of the fourteenth century. The first statutes of Provisors and 
Praemunire (1351, 1353)255 seem to have had little effect on the York 
252. See generally THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY IN nm MIDDLE AGES (C, 
Lawrence ed. 1965). 
253. J. SAYERS, supra note 25, at x..xiv-x.·w. She notes, however, that the beginnings 
of the decline of the institution were shortly after the end of her period. Id. at 276-'1'1, 
254. See note 128 supra. 
255. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 4 (1351); 27 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 1 (1353). 
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court's practice of hearing benefice cases.256 The second set of such 
statutes (1390, 1393),257 however, do seem to have had an effect, result-
ing, for a time, in the disappearance of benefice cases from the cause 
papers.258 Since over two thirds of the benefice cases had been tuitorial 
appeals, the change is more at the expense of the Roman court's juris-' 
diction than of the York court's. Other prohibitable types of cases 
continue, and, indeed, contract cases increase in the same period. 
On the whole, however, these changes are slight. There is no 
perceptible change in attitude toward papal law or the uses to which 
it was put. The records exist for carrying the study on into the fif-
teenth century (where we might expect to find a decline in papal 
influence), but, unfortunately, the work remains to be done. 
(3) Both Stubbs and Maitland write on the question of the bind-
ing quality of papal law irrespective of the type of case in which it is 
to be applied. They ignore the distinction between laws that are 
enforced only if some private party seeks to have them enforced and 
laws that the law-giver or his agents enforce on their own motion-in 
short, the distinction between what we today call civil and criminal 
law and what the canonists called instance and office cases.259 Some 
scholars seem to suggest that some of the papal law, although intended 
to be enforced as criminal law, was only enforced if the private party 
sought i.ts enforcement, and hence that it was less binding than in-
tended.200 
Unfortunately, the evidence we have examined in this Article 
affords little opportunity to compare instance and office cases. The 
only office cases that survive from the York Consistory Court records 
of the fourteenth century are cases in which the official is seeking to 
enforce one of his own orders in an instance matter.261 There were -~ 
256. See Table I supra. 
257. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, cc. 2-3 (1390); 16 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1393). 
258. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra. 
259. Like most analogies, the statement "civil cases : criminal cases :: office matters : 
instance matters" is not quite exact. In addition to instance matters and "pure" 
office matters (negocia ex officio mero), the English canon law also recognized a hybrid 
-"promoted" office matters (negocia ex officio promoto). These last were roughly 
equivalent to private criminal prosecutions. See B. WooncoCK, supra note 68, at 50-
62, 68-71. Further, the remedy sought in many straight instance cases, excommunica-
tion of the defendant, would probably be regarded today as penal rather than civil. 
See text accompanying notes 106-09 supra. Finally, in office matters it is the judge, 
by virtue of his office, and not the state or the crown (or the Church), who is the 
nominal party plaintiff, and, except in promoted office matters, there seems to 
have been no one who performed the function of the modern prosecutor. See B. 
WooDCOCK, supra. 
260. See A. OGLE, supra note 30; Gray, supra note 39. 
261. E.g., Archbishop of York c. Prior & Convent of Nostell, CP.E. 57 (1343) 
(prosecution for violation of a sequestration order). 
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indubitably other kinds of office cases heard in York in this period, 
but the surviving records strongly suggest that they were heard by 
some other court. The situation in thirteenth-century Canterbury 
is less clear, but the records of office matters that have come to light 
have not yet been examined in sufficient depth for us to know whether 
they are detailed and copious enough to permit comparisons of the 
law being applied with that being applied in instance matters. 
The office records that the author has examined are not very help-
ful. For example, the earliest act book of the Court of the Dean and 
Chapter of York consists of brief and generally unhelpful entries in 
what appear to be predominantly cases of fornication.262 If the com-
plex papal rules concerning, let us say, pluralism (the holding of more 
than one benefice) were being enforced at all, it is doubtful that we 
will find records of their enforcement in this type of court.263 It seems 
more likely that such matters would not have been handled in a 
lower level "bawdy court"264 but by the archbishop or bishop per-
sonally, either during visitations or in his personal court of audience. 
Unfortunately, visitation and audience records for our period do not 
seem to have had a high survival rate, and, again, more work needs to 
be done with those that have survived. 
There is, however, one final element20u in the instance records that 
we have examined that has some bearing on the Stubbs-Maitland 
debate: Without too much overreading, we can get from Stubbs a 
picture of an embattled English church struggling to enforce native 
English law and custom against an ever-increasing flood of bulls, "hot 
from Rome."266 On the other hand, again without too much over-
reading, we can get from Maitland a picture of an equally embattled 
English church struggling to enforce every jot and tittle of the papal 
law in the face of ever-increasing royal pressure to limit the field of 
application of that law. If we read at least the instance records of the 
ecclesiastical courts, however, we do not get the picture of an em-
262. D/C.AB. 1 (1387-1494), found in Borthwick Institute, York, described in J. 
PURVIS, A MEDIAEVAL Acr BooK WITH SO.ME ACCOUNT OF ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICflON 
AT YORK (1943). 
263. The same can be said of an issue deeply involved in the Becket controversy, 
the prosecution of felonious clerks. See note 243 supra. 
264. See BEFORE THE BAWDY COURT: SELECTIONS FRO!II CHURCH COURT RECORDS (P. 
Hair ed. 1972). 
265. In addition to my own research, I have drawn on the following for these con• 
eluding remarks: J. SAYERS, supra note 25; R. Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in 
Medieval England (unpublished manuscript); Morris, A Consistory Court in the Middle 
Ages, 14 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HlsTORY 150 (1963). 
266. I am indebted for this phrase to Geoffrey Chaucer. See G. CHAUCER, General 
Prologue, in THE CANTERBURY TALES, fragment I (group A), line 687 {the Pardoner), 
in THE WORKS OF GEOFFREY CHAUCER 23 (2d ed. F. Robinson 1957). 
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battled institution at all, and we find strikingly little evidence of 
substantive law. 
Most of the cases never reach the sentence stage. They are either 
abandoned by the plaintiff or compromised.267 Litigation is controlled 
by the parties. If they do not choose to force an issue, the court rarely 
does. There is even some evidence that the York court positively dis-
couraged the litigants from obtaining a sentence, for it charged liti-
gants a very high fee for the sentence in comparison to the fees that it 
charged at other stages of the proceedings.268 
Rarely do we see the court taking an active role in the litigation 
beyond making procedural rulings. Even in marriage cases we see 
little evidence that the court felt that the law, papal or local, should 
be enforced if the parties to the case did not seek its enforcement. 
In fact, if we seek a modem analogy to the court's function, arbitra-
tion, rather than adjudication, comes more immediately to mind. 
We have seen how, on many occasions, the papal law gets lost in 
local law or cusom. The phenomenon is of broader applicability. 
Time and again substantive law is entirely lost in the specifics of the 
dispute; the general gives way to the particular. It may be that the 
reason why so few records of legal argument survive is that legal 
arguments just weren't very important. ' 
Now, there should be nothing surprising to the student of the 
legal system today that far more cases were filed in York than ever 
reached sentence. Far more cases are filed today than ever reach 
judgment, and there is no reason why we should think that this 
characteristic of litigation is a purely modem phenomenon. Since 
the York court was primai:ily a court of first instance, it ·also should 
not surprise us that the facts of the case and adjective law are far 
more important than substantive law. We are familiar today with 
267. The records, unfortunately, do not allow us to determine precisely what 
percentage of the cases were abandoned and what percentage compromised, nor can 
we be completely sure that some of the cases did not reach the sentence stage, the 
sentence now being lost. This last possibility, however, would not explain the large 
number of cases that never reach a sentence in the act books, even though the acta 
of the court go on. 
268. E.g., Alice, wife of John Clerk c. William de Stapleton, CP.E. 196 (1393). 
This is a straightforward defamation case in which Alice alleges that William falsely 
accused her of stealing a robe and a kerchief and receives judgment in her favor. The 
list of expenses that she claims is long and complicated, and the figures do not seem 
to add up to the total. Be that as it may be, lls.13d. arc identifiable on the list as 
having been paid to the court or its officers. Of this sum 7s.Bd. were paid at the 
sentence stage: 2s. "for the sentence," 4d. "for the summoner" (at the sentence stage), 
2s.18d. "for citing the defendant anew," and 2s.6d. "for execution of the sentence." 
Expenses this high at the sentence stage are by no means atypical. See, e.g., William 
Mowbray, Rector of Normanby c. Thomas Crathorne, CP.E. 177 (1390); Marjory Spuret 
c. Thomas de Hornby, CP.E. 205-07, 209 (1394). 
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trial judges who actively encourage settlement, and many modem 
judges, not only trial judges, do not regard it as their function in 
civil cases to enforce the law to any greater extent than the parties 
ask them to enforce it. The striking thing about the York court is not 
the presence of these characteristics but their dominance. The relative 
unimportance of substantive law characterizes not only first instance 
cases but also appeal cases, where we might expect to find substantive 
law more important. The encouragement of settlement prevailed 
despite a relati_vely uncrowded docket-docket overload being 
thought to be the chief source today of pressure on judges to get 
cases settled. And the passive attitude of the court toward the enforce-
ment of substantive law is found in the court of an institution that, 
unlike today's state, felt that the enforcement of its laws was its duty 
so that men's souls might thereby be saved. 
Now, all of this does not make the papal law any less binding, 
but it does make it considerably less important. Earlier we suggested 
that it was somewhat paradoxical that the York court seems to have 
been a strong institution despite the fact that papal law was binding 
upon it. Its strength is paradoxical, however, only if the enforcement 
of papal law was an important element in the court's function and 
was so perceived by the participants in the process. Much of what we 
have found about the court would indicate that it was not. Many of 
the cases it heard involved claims based on local statute or custom, 
with papal law only indirectly involved. The way that papal law was 
applied in those cases where it was directly involved seems to have 
given the court considerable leeway in choosing a rule for the case. 
Further, many cases were settled or compromised, and there is no 
suggestion that the court felt compelled to see that these settlements 
or compromises accorded with the papal law. 
The relative unimportance of papal law suggests that the York 
court was not viewed by contemporary society, and perhaps that it 
was not viewed by the personnel of the court themselves, primarily 
as the place where papal law was enforced but, rather, as one of a 
number of alternative places where disputes could be resolved. The 
court would summon litigants before it; it would fix, where necessary, 
the position of the litigants during the pendency of the dispute; it 
would provide a quite sophisticated mechanism for bringing to light 
the facts of the case; and it would listen to the arguments on each side. 
It would even render a judgment within the broad confines of the law 
found in the papal law books, if•the litigants insisted upon it. But 
rendering judgments was not what the court spent the vast bulk of 
its time doing, nor was it the way that most cases were terminated. 
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Most of the records are devoted to the process itself, not to the end 
result. Perhaps this is because the process was the important thing,269 
and the desired result was not a sentence by the judge but accord 
between the parties. 
Maitland's Lyndwood essay closes with a vivid imaginary con-
versation between Lyndwood and Majtland in which Maitland sug-
gests the Stubbs position to Lyndwood and Lyndwood replies that if 
Maitland persists in that view he ·will. be turned over to the secular 
arm to be burned.270 Perhaps we should recast that conversation in 
the light of what we have said above: "My dear fellow," we would 
have Lyndwood say to Maitland's posing of the Stubbs view, "if you 
are making that proposition to me because I am a doctor of laws and 
have written a book called Provinciale, I would have to tell you that 
if you propose that view in a disputation I will demolish it, and if 
you put that view into a book, I will do my best to have the book 
burned. Indeed, if that view were yours and you persisted in it, you 
might well be burned too. But I know it is not your view, but that of 
the heretical Bishop of Oxford, and that your ovm view is much closer 
to the mind of Holy Mother the Church, however peculiar your 
views on other matters may be. 
0 
"But if you are asking me this question because I am the Official 
of the Court of Canterbury, then I will tell you that we at the court 
have found your whole debate with Bishop Stubbs somewhat beside 
the point. You are talking of matters that concern kings and popes 
and professors. We, on the other hand, see before us every day men 
whose souls are in peril because they are quarreling. If one of them 
persists in offending his brother, Our Lord tells us271 that we must 
cast him out from the Church, and if we do and he remains unre-
pentant, he will surely be damned. But what of him who has had his 
brother cast out and what of us who have done ~e casting? Shall 
t~ 
269. The preceding paragraphs in the text suggest what role the judge in medieval 
canon law in fact played, to the extent that we can determine this from the court 
records. If I am right, there are obvious implications for the study of the judicial 
function in the broad. See generally G. DAWSON, supra note 190. Even if the medieval 
ecclesiastical judges were acting more as arbitrators than as enforcers of the law, 
however, there still remains the question of the extent to which they were a~vare 
of this fact. The academic canon law provides some indication that they were aware 
and that they were playing just the role that the canon law had designed for them. 
I can do no more at this point than suggest that the topic merits further consider-
ation on another occasion. See generally G. LE BRAS, C. LEFEBVRE & J. RAMBAUD, supra 
note 187, at 416-20, 446-59; 6 DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE ]uge (Recours a 
l'Office du) 208 (1957), 
270. Maitland, supra note 20, at 475-76, reprinted in F. MArrLAND, supra note 19, 
at 45-46. 
271. Matthew 18:17. 
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we not have to answer before the judgment seat for the damnation 
of one for whom Christ died? How much better it would be if the 
quarrel ceased and peace were restored, for as the Apostle tells us 
'there is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits one with 
another'272 and again, in another place, 'but the greatest of these is 
charity.' "273 
APPENDIX A 
A Note on Statistics 
Much survives from the medieval English ecclesiastical courts, 
but what survives shows us that much more has been lost. The extent 
to which we can make meaningful generalizations about the whole 
and not just about the portion that has survived depends on the 
surviving records' being fairly typical of the whole. The extent to 
which we can make meaningful statistical statements about the whole 
depends on much more: The surviving records must be a random 
sample of the whole. 
In the process of trying to determine whether the surviving 
fourteenth-century York cause papers are a random sample of all the 
cause papers filed in York for that century, I have convinced myself 
that the surviving papers are, at the least, "fairly typical" of the whole. 
Nothing that I have found in the fourteenth-century act book frag-
ments or in the fuller act books from the early portions of the fifteenth 
century would lead one to believe tha~ any given type of case was 
systematically culled from the cause papers or that any given type 
of case has been preferred for selection. Thus, most of the statements 
made in this paper about the general nature of the York jurisdiction 
in the fourteenth century seem to be valid when judged against the 
criterion of "fair typicality." 
In a few places, however, I have gone further and have tried to 
make statements about (a) the proportions of types of cases actually 
heard in the consistory court during the century (note 63 supra) and 
(b) the significance of the absence of benefice cases from the surviving 
cause papers for the years 1390-1399 (note 111 supra). Although my 
thesis does not stand or fall on either of these statements, they do 
help to round out the picture, and they represent an attempt to use 
church court records in a way that, to my knowledge, they have not 
been used before. Some explanation, then, of the assumptions made 
and techniques used may be useful. 
Both the note 63 proportions and the note 111 significance test 
are valid only if the surviving cause papers are a random sample. 
That they are cannot be irrefutably proved. The records of the 
272. 1 Corinthians 6:7. 
273. Id. 13:13. 
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underlying population of cases have been lost, and, however the 
records were kept, their preservation clearly did not depend on the 
use of a random number table. The randomness of the sample must . 
be shown, if at all, from inferences drawn from the nature of what 
has survived and what we know about the history. of how the records 
were kept. 
Two hypotheses as to why these particular records survived come 
immediately to mind. The process by which the other records have 
been lost could be an essentially random one. Damp, fire, dust, casual 
loss, and random destruction (for example, throwing out all the 
records on the top of randomly sorted piles) could have taken their 
toll over the centuries until we are left with what we have now. 
Alternatively, someone at some period could have made selections 
from the papers for whatever purpose and have destroyed the rest. 
The two possibilities are not mutually exclusive; various combina-
tions of haphazard and conscious processes could have resulted in the 
loss or destruction of those records that do not survive. 
The nature of the records today lends support to the "notion that 
their survival is the result of haphazard, if not random, processes. 
Most of the fourteenth-century cause papers were written on parch-
ment, and parchment is tough stuff. But the 600-odd years that sep-
arate us from the time the cause papers were written have taken their 
toll. There is no evidence of fire visible on the records themselves, 
but there is some evidence of damp and a great deal of evidence of 
dust, apparently coal dust. This dust has reduced many of the rec-
ords to an extremely fragile state, some to the point of illegibility. 
It is not hard to imagine that some of the original sets of records 
simply disintegrated over time. Further, there is considerable evi-
dence of rough treatment. Many of the records are tom, particularly 
on the edges, and virtually all of them were folded or rolled many 
times, processes that lead to cracking and further disintegration, par-
ticularly as the parchment dries out. 
The surviving records show little indication that they have been 
consciously selected for preservation as a part of a general house-
cleaning in which other records were discarded. There is no percep-
tible pattern in the persons, places, or legal issues involved in the 
cases. Unusual cases and routine cases, files containing over fifty 
documents and files containing just one document are jumbled to-
gether in a seemingly haphazard fashion. Indeed, from the time that 
the fourteenth-century endorsements were placed on the records to 
the time when they were re-endorsed in the nineteenth century, there 
is no evidence that anyone attempted to sort the documents, much 
less cull them. 
There are three possible exceptions to these generalizations. First, 
one file (CP .E. 107) contains three cases, one each from the early 
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fourteenth, late fourteenth, and early fifteenth centuries, all of which 
deal ·with the same parish church. While this grouping may have 
occurred in the nineteenth century, it is possible that these causes 
were gathered together as precedep.ts either for the fifteenth-century 
case or for some lat.~r case involving the same church. There is, how-
ever, no other grouping of this sort, and one biased selection does not 
seriously jeopardize the randomness of a sample of over 200 cases. 
Second, there is one file (CP.E. 241) that contains single documents 
from a miscellany of fourteenth-century cases. Although no particular 
pattern can be discerned in these cases, the documents may have 
been culled from the files at some time for the purpose of compiling 
a collection of precedents. There is, however, no evidence that these 
documents were grouped together before the cause papers were 
sorted and modern numbers assigned to them at the Borthwick, and 
it may have been convenient at that time to put all the one-document 
files together. Third, there is a run of cases from the 1380's in which 
the names of two proctors appear with disturbing regularity.274 
While the possibility that these cases survive from the private collec-
tions of these proctors cannot be completely excluded, the evidence 
would seem to point in another direction: With few exceptions what 
survives is the court's copy of the documents. This appears from the 
fact that they contain the registry endorsement telling who filed the 
document and when. Further, there are breaks in the run---cases in 
which the name of neither proctor appears.27G Finally, the number of 
proctors admitted to practice before the court was probably quite 
small, and the number of active proctors even smaller.276 It is quite 
274. The regular practice of endorsing the document with the name of the proctor 
who filed it begins in the York courts around the middle of the 1360's. From this 
time onwards we can get a fairly good idea of who the proctors were. Beginning 
in 1380 and extending to 1389, for a run of twenty-five cases, the name of either 
Nicholas Esyngwald or John Stanton, Jr., appears in all but two sets of papers, In 
eight cases both men appear either on the same or opposite sides. The two e....:ceptions 
are cases in which the name of the proctor on only one side is recorded; hence it is 
possible that either Stanton or Esyngwald represented the other side. Of course, 
other proctors' names appear as well and not all the documents in these cases were 
filed in either Stanton's or Esyngwald's name. There is a possibility, however, that 
both of them collected documents in cases in which they were involved and that these 
documents form the basis of the current collection for this decade. Even if this were 
true, our random sample would not completely collapse. The decade lll80-llJ89 looks 
very much like the other decades in terms of the types of cases heard. See Table I 
supra. Further, for reasons stated in the text infra, I am inclined to the view that 
the Stanton-Esyngwald private collection hypothesis is implausible, 
275. CP.E. 124 (1381); CP .E, 146 (1386). See note 274 supra. 
276. In 1311, Archbishop Greenfield limited the number of proctors that could be 
admitted to practice before the court to eight. 2 D. WILKINS, CONCILIA l\fAGNAE 
BRITANNIAE ET HmERNIAE 410 (1737). This number seems to have been held constant. 
At least, we find evidence of its being held to eight in both the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. See R. MARCHANT, Tm: CHURCH UNDER THE LAw: JusrICE, ADMINISTRATION 
AND DISCIPLINE IN THE DIOCESE OF YoRK, 1560-1640, at 55-56 (1969); K. Burns, The Ad-
ministrative System of the Ecclesiastical Courts in the Diocese and Province of York: 
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conceivable that two proctors took one or the other side of virtually 
every case heard during this period. · 
What little is known of the history of these records also tends to 
support the notion that the survival of these particular cause papers 
was the product of an essentially random process. That the court had 
a registrar (chief clerk) in the fourteenth century may be determined 
from the numerous references to this officer in the cause papers 
themselves.277 No evidence, however, has come to my attention that 
would indicate where the registrar had his registry and what the 
relation was benv-een his office and that of the Archbishop's registrar. 
At some time, probably quite early on, the cause papers found their 
way into the keeping of the York diocesan registrar where they were 
kept with a much larger set of records. 
The glimpses that we have of how the diocesan records were kept 
are depressing to the archivist but encouraging to the historical 
statistician looking for evidence of a random process of survival. 
Thomas Jubb, the Registrar in the early eighteenth century, re-
ports:21s 
In the search made from the Restauration till 1714 when Mr. 
Mawde dyed and I Thomas Jubb was made Registrar for the Dean 
and Chapter of York the following things are to be observed. 
I. That when I entered upon the said office every thing was in 
great disorder and confusion and so indeed Mr. Mawde found that 
Office at Mr. Squire's death. 
The "great disorder and confusion" is probably a result of the seige 
and occupation of York by Cromwell's troops. Indeed, in the same 
report Jubb notes that during the "Troublesome Times" the registry 
office was gutted and loose papers destroyed,279 
In his contribution to the First Report on the Public Records 
in 1800 the then-Deputy Registrar, Joseph Buckle, notes, perhaps 
overly optimistically, that the records were secure from fire and damp 
and that certain classes of older records were dirty, injured, and 
mutilated.280 
Finally, the Reverend Canon J. S. Purvis, the first director of 
the Borthwick, reports on the condition of the records prior to 
World War Il: 281 
Part I, The Medieval Courts 145-47 (1962) (unpublished manuscript on file at the 
Borthwick Institute, York). On the smaller number of active proctors, see K. Burns, id. 
277, E.g., CP.E. 93 (1376). 
278. Quoted in J. PURVIS, THE ARCHIVES OF YORK DIOCESAN REGISTRY 6 (St. Anthony's 
Hall Fublications No. 2, 1952). 
279. Id. 
280, Id. at 7. 
281. Id. at 8. 
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The conditions of storage left very much to be desired; in general, 
files were roughly bound up in brown paper, and many documents 
were rolled, crushed or folded into bundles, and thrust much too 
closely together on the shelves; a large number suffered damage, 
either from damp or from nearness to the heat of the pipes which 
warmed the Strong Rooms in winter, or from the rough folding or 
the constriction of the strings with which they were tied; all suffered 
severely from dirt, the accumulation of a thick coat of fine black dust. 
Old files of which the strings had burst, allowing the members to 
be scattered, had been gathered up hastily and made into bundles 
and thrust away into any handy nook on the shelves, where they 
remained unwanted and undisturbed £or year after year. As docu-
ments steadily accumulated, the congestion became worse, and there 
was never time for any systematic arrangement or even inspection 
by the Registry clerks, and the contents of the Registry became more 
and more unknown. 
Another possible source of essentially random loss is moving. 
Prior to the removal of the records to the Borthwick, there are two 
recorded moves, one in I 790, the other around 1840.282 The custody 
of the records, moreover, .was the personal responsibility of the 
registrar, and during the earlier period before there was a formal 
registry office, they may well have been kept in his house. Each trans-
fer from old to new registrar would have been an occasion for loss. 
In sum, while the evidence is not completely conclusive, it does 
point to a random process of survival of these records.283 
The sratistical techniques that I have employed are relatively 
simple. In note 63, I have calculated the confidence intervals for the 
proportion that each major type of case in the sample bears to the 
whole. The technique may be illustrated by supposing that we have 
a tub containing a very large number of balls of different colors. 
Rather than counting all the balls to determine the proportion of 
balls of each color to all the_ rest, we take a random sample of 100 
balls and discover that 30 are red. If we rely on the sample for the 
proposition that exactly 30 per cent of all the balls are red, our 
chances of being right are very low. On the other hand if we rely 
282. Id. at 7. 
283. One more doubt: The surviving act books for the latter part of the fourteenth 
and the fifteenth centuries indicate that the court heard between 50 and 100 cases 
a year that would have had cause papers. See, e.g., [Dean &: Chapter Library, York] 
M2(b)l (about 30 cases over a six-month period); K. Burns, supra note 276, at 167 
(modal figure between 90-100 for six years in fifteenth century). The small number of 
sets of papers that survive from the first three decades of the century means either that 
the court was hearing far fewer cases at this time or that time bas been less kindly 
to the older records. If the latter is the case, then we do not have a i-andom sample of 
cases from the whole century but only one from, say, each decade, The only type of case 
that shows any marked difference in proportion over the decades, however, is benefice 
(see note 111 supra), and here our statistical technique has taken into account the 
difference in decades (see discussion infra). 
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on the sample for the proposition that somewhere between 20 per 
cent and 40 per cent of the balls in the underlying population are 
red, our chances of being right are much higher. In fact, by consulting 
standard statistical tables,284 we discover that we will be right more 
than 19 out of 20 times. 
The figures given in note 63 are based on an assumption that we 
are willing to be ·wrong one out of ten times (a confidence coefficient 
of .90). Given that confidence coefficient and a sample of roughly 250 
cases, the standard statistical tables tell us within what range (confi-
dence interval) the proportions in the sample of cases represent the 
actual proportions in the underlying population of cases. Selection 
of a higher confidence coefficient would have resulted in wider confi-
dence intervals; selection of a lower coefficient, in narrower intervals. 
Raising or lowering the confidence coefficient by .05, however, 
changes most of the intervals by only a few percentage points. 
The technique involved in note 111 is a bit more complicated. 
Suppose we have that same tub of colored balls and suppose this time 
that we have some reason to believe that 50 per cent of them are red. 
We draw a random sample of 100 balls and come up with 30 red balls. 
This is surprising, but before we reject our theory that half of the 
balls are red, we want to test to see what the chances are that a ran-
dom draw of balls from a population, 50 per cent of whic:4 are red, 
would yield only 30 per cent red balls. A most useful statistic for 
doing this is chi2• Chi8 can be calculated for any sample of decent size 
wliere the expected value (50/50 in our balls case) and the actual 
value (30 /70) of the statistics we wish to examine are known. From 
there the calculation of the probability that the divergence between 
actual and expected could have arisen by chance becomes a matter of 
consulting standard tables.285 
In note 111 we wished to determine what the chances were that 
the absence of benefice cases in the years 1390-1399 was caused by 
chance. On the basis of the number of benefice cases in the preceding 
decades we would expect that 13 per cent of the cases in this decade 
would be benefice cases. Thus, we would expect to find 9 benefice 
cases in a random sample of 72 cases, and, in fact, we find none. 
Since a sample size of 72 is quite large enough for the calculation of 
chi3, we apply the following formula: 
(Ob - Eb)2 (Oo - Eo) 2 
X2=------I------
Eb Eo 
284. E.g., W. DIXON &: F. MAsSEY, INTRODUCTION TO STATISIICAL ANALYSIS 413-16 
(Tables A-9a to A-9d) (2d ed. 1957). More on confidence intervals for proportions may 
be found in id. at 81-82. 
285. E.g., id. at 386-87 (Table A-6b). See generally id. at 221-27; H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL 
STATISTICS 212-21 (1960). 
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Where: Ob = the number of benefice cases observed in the sample 
Eb = the number of benefice cases expected 
0 0 = the number of other (nonbenefice) cases observed 
Ea = the number of other cases expected 
(0 - 9)2 (72 - 63)2 
"l.2=---+----=10.3 
9 63 
Consultation of the tables reveals that a chi2 statistic for a propor-
tion (one degree of freedom) will be greater than 7.9 only I in 200 
times and greater than 10.8 only 1 in 1000 times. Thus, the chances 
that we would get a sample with no benefice cases drawn from a 
population with 13 per cent benefice cases appears to be about I in 
1000, It is far more probable that our expectation was mistaken and 
that the proportion of benefice to other cases heard in the 1390-1399 
decade was far smaller than it had been in the previous decades of 
the century. 
APPENDIX B 
"Brief' for the Defendant in John of Elham, c. 
Alice, daughter of Richard Cissor [Tailor?]280 
Ad informacionem domini J udicis ad sentenciandum in causa matri-
moniali Inter J ohannem de Elham petentem et Aliciam filiam 
Ricardi Cissoris de dovor' rem tentem, lecto libello et contestaciop.e 
ad eundem, recitatis attestacionibus partis actricis, inspiciantur intime 
excepciones ex parte rea proponite quarum prima est de diversitate, 
contrarietate seu singularitate forme contractus quam testes expri-
munt que ex ipsis deposicionibus dare colligitur prout in dicta 
prima excepcione vel eius racione rubricatur. 
ff. secunda excepcio vel racio de contrarietate et periurio eorundem 
testium super repugnancia personarum presencium in clicto contractu 
eodem modo colligitur et rubricatur. 
ff. tercia, scilicet, de diversitate loci in quo dicitur contractus cele-
bratus a sedentibus, dare liquet. Hii sunt defectus evidentes pri-
marum attestacionum. 
ff. Quarta excepcio que facta est super violencia in dicto contractu 
mulieri adhibita probatur per iiij0r testes, scilicet, per Garth, Adam, 
Johannem, Luciam, in suis deposicionibus sic figitur hec [sic] 
littera "a,"-Quod autem dicitur et allegatur pro parte actrice quod 
286. Sede Vacante Scrapbook No. III, at 62 (No. 131) (Cathedral Library, Canter-
bury). See notes 197-218 supra and accompanying text. Extensions and modernization 
of punctuation have been made without comment. The capitalization, except at the 
beginning of sentences, strives to be faithful to the original. Additions to the text arc 
indicated in square b,rackcts ([ ]), conjectural readings in diamond brackets (( )), 
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hec excepcio et ipsius probacio non subsistit, eo quod est articulus 
primo contrarius super quo non possunt testes produci post publicas 
attestaciones, verum dicunt sed male discemunt. Sunt enim iiij0 t 
genera articulorum quantum ad materiam presentem considerandi 
[sic]: idem articulus vel penitus contrarius, talis, scilicet, qui primum 
penitus et directe interimat, et super neutro istorum potest fieri 
product~o post attestaciones publicas super primo, ut de testibus, c. 
veniens, secundo [X 2.20.38.12], et de probacionibus, iuravit [X 
2.19.6], cum suis concordanciis. Est et articulus penitus a primo 
diversus [sed] non conttarius, et est quattus articulus ex primo de-
pendens, primum supponens et aliquid adiciens primo, [sed] non 
ipsum penitus interimens, ut de testibus, c. tam litteris, § quia vero 
super matrimonio [X 2.20.23], et de fide instrumentorum, cum Jo-
hannes [X 2.22.10], cum suis concordanciis. Et super istis duobus 
articulis bene admittuntur testes post attestaciones publicas super 
primis articulis, sicut notat de testibus, fratemitatis, in glossa super 
novis [X 2.20.17]. Talis est casus quem pre manibus habemus. 
Excepcio enim violencie supponit formam contractus affuisse sed 
substanciam defuisse, scilicet, consensum, qui locum non habet ubi 
coactio intercedit, ut de sponsalibus, cum locum [X 4.1.14]. Nee est 
racio aliqua quare non ita bene possit probari post attestaciones 
publicas, absencia consensus vel animi, sicut absencia corporis. Nam 
sicut potest contrahi matrimonium per presentem consensum corpore 
absente, ut per nuncium vel epistolam, sic potest deficere inter 
presentes si consensus absit. Sicut enim furiosus dicitur absens animo, 
licet presens corpore, ut ff. de regulis iuris, sic non vocem, § furiosus 
[Digest 50.17.40], sic et coactus dicitur absens, scilicet, animo qui 
requiritur in matrimonio, licet presens sit corpore. Probatur ulterius 
quad medius testis viri non interfuit per iiij0 r qua testes predictos a 
pucto "b," et licet sit negativa, quia tamen limitatur per certum fac-
tum, tempus et locum multum dicitur movere iudicem inter alia, 
secus si cetera vaga et indiscreta, nullo certo facto, tempore, et loco 
determinata, qualis est quod <is> numquam contraxit vel citatus 
non exstitit, que probari non potest. 
ff. probantur etiam verba mulieris dissensum denotantia. Ubi ipsi 
instant, dantes quod non usque sunt verba negativa, quod <vere-
nde[?] > est dicere et contra matrimoniam manifeste. Ut notat Gof-
fredus, titulus de probacionibus, § debet enim, <verso>: "Item 
factum negativum probari non potest sed dictum negativum. Sic de 
probacionibus, c. tercio [X 2.19.5], de desponsacione impuberum, ex 
litteris [X 4.2.11].''287 Et est racio quia omries circumstancie et 
287. The quotation from Geoffrey is exact except that the citations have been 
expanded and a citation to Gratian's Decretum (causa 31, questio 2, c, 4) has been 
omitted. See GEOFFREDUS TRANENSIS, supra note 198, tit. de probacionibus, § debet enim. 
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cause sciencie possunt concurrere in dicta negativo que in dicta af • 
firmativo, videlicet, loci, temporis, personarum, et alie infinite. Pro• 
batur ulterius quod publica vox et fama in villa Dovor' [est] quod 
dolus et violencia intercesserunt in dicta facto et quod testes corrupti 
ad perhibendum falsum testimonium exstiterunt, que fama equipol• 
lens uni testi et unus peroptime deposuit de corrupcione. Predicta 
vox et fama probatur per omnes testes a pucto "c." 
ff. Quod de eodem facto deponunt primi testes et secundi manifestat 
ydemptitas loci, diei et hore, presencia earumdem personarum, unitas 
contractus in quern omnes concurrunt quoad formam, licet secundi 
adiciant primis quoad substanciam, et quoad in Iitteris <remten-
tiam> reliqua supleat riligio [sic] iudicantis si placet. 
